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This paper examines whether complying with U.S. GAAP impacts non-U.S. firms’ cross-
listing decisions and listing choices. The capital market consequence of U.S. GAAP 
compliance is also evaluated. Using two constructs (reconciliation and disclosure) 
established at the firm level to proxy for foreign firms’ U.S. GAAP compliance costs, I 
find that complying with U.S. financial reporting requirements is a significant cost factor 
when non-U.S. firms consider whether they should issue or list their shares in the U.S. 
This finding is consistent with previous survey or case studies which recognize that 
complying with U.S. GAAP is an important consideration when foreign firms 
contemplate U.S. listings. However, the significance of compliance costs diminishes as 
foreign firms decide whether or not they should cross-list on an organized stock exchange. 
The lack of finding is likely attributable to the fact that cross-listing, especially exchange-
listing, gives foreign firms various benefits, such as cross-listing premiums, which 
potentially outweigh the compliance costs. The valuation analyses confirm the existence 
of cross-listing premiums. I further find that disclosure costs negatively affect the value 
of cross-listed firms; i.e., cross-listed firms that disclose less accounting information 
(incurring higher disclosure costs) are valued less by the market. This result is consistent 
with the general theme in the literature that disclosure matters. This study extends prior 
research by directly examining a major cross-listing cost, offering a more comprehensive 
measure of U.S. GAAP compliance, and measuring the costs at the firm level. It 
contributes to the understanding of the role accounting plays in non-U.S. firms’ cross-
listing activities.    
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Over the last decade, the U.S. market has seen a dramatic increase in the number 
of non-U.S. firms listing or issuing securities through the American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs) program. The number of cross-listed firms has grown from 158 in 1990 to more 
than 2,000 in 2006.  In response to this rapid growth of cross-border listing, researchers 
in economics, law, finance and accounting have sought to understand the motives, costs 
and benefits, and impact of corporate decisions to list shares on foreign exchanges (see 
the review papers of Karolyi 1998, 2004 for details).  
The literature has in general documented various benefits, especially higher 
valuations called “cross-listing premium or effects” associated with the U.S. listing.  
However, Leuz (2003) claims that the sources of cross-listing effects are not well 
understood.  He suggests exploiting the cross-sectional variation in listing effects to 
examine this issue further. He also recommends introducing explicitly institutional 
variables and firm characteristics as explanatory variables in order to yield new insights 
into the costs and benefits of cross-listing and their sources.   
Prior empirical archival research has seldom examined the cross-listing activities 
directly from the cost side. Since cross-listing premiums are essentially the net benefits 
(benefits – costs), an investigation into the costs that non-U.S. firms incur would help to 
identify the potential sources of listing premiums. For example, firms receiving higher 
listing premiums may be the ones that have lower cross-listing costs. 
Furthermore, despite the recent surge in ADR listings, fewer than one in ten large 
public companies from outside the U.S. have actually chosen to cross-list in the U.S. 
(Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz 2004). Given all the benefits associated with cross-listing as 
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identified in previous studies, one may ask what inhibits more foreign companies from 
coming to the U.S.  A direct examination of the cross-listing costs would help to shed 
some light on this question.  
In general, prior literature has identified the following as the main costs incurred 
by foreign private issuers: meeting the U.S. accounting and disclosure standards, listing 
charges and professional service fees, and potential litigation risks. 1, 2   In particular, 
since U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) is recognized as one 
of the highest quality sets of financial reporting standards in the world (Dye and Sunder 
2001; Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller 2004), many have suggested that the primary 
obstacle to a foreign company wishing to list securities in the U.S. is to meet the U.S. 
accounting and disclosure requirements (Rader 1994).  Indeed, evidence from survey or 
case studies (Mittoo 1992; Radebaugh, Gebhardt and Gray 1995; Fanto and Karmel 1997) 
has consistently shown that complying with U.S. GAAP is a major cost that managers 
weigh against benefits when they determine whether it is optimal for foreign firms to list 
or issue shares in the U.S.   
However, there has been little empirical archival research that directly examines 
the effect of complying with U.S. GAAP except early studies by Biddle and Saudagaran 
                                                 
1 The litigation threat incurs because foreign firms subject themselves to U.S. laws and the regulatory 
oversight of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Whether this threat is real or not is an 
empirical issue. For example, Siegel (2005), who investigates the illegal asset-taking by insiders of 
Mexican firms, concludes that “U.S. law enforcement neither deterred nor punished” the expropriation of 
billions of dollars. He also finds that very few SEC actions have ever been taken against foreign registrants.  
2 With the recent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) which imposes corporate governance 
regulations on all public companies including foreign registrants, the potential cost of listing on a U.S. 
exchange has significantly increased.  However, to provide foreign registrants with some relief, the SEC 
has adopted a number of significant exemptions for foreign registrants (e.g., audit committee independence) 
and is willing to make accommodation to foreign registrants (e.g., extending the compliance date of section 
404 internal control reporting to July 15, 2007).  Consequently, identifying the true impact of SOX 
compliance costs on foreign firms cannot be addressed in this paper and remains to be explored.  
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(1989) and Saudagaran and Biddle (1992), and a recent work by Hope, Kang and Zang 
(2005). Biddle and Saugadaran’s research was largely motivated by the heated debate 
between the SEC and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in the early 1990s over the 
issue of appropriate accounting and disclosure requirements for foreign private issuers.3 
They investigate the impact of financial disclosure levels of nine major stock exchanges 
in eight countries on firms’ foreign stock exchange listing decisions. One significant 
finding is that stringent disclosure requirements inhibit cross-border listings. 
Motivated by the cross-listing phenomenon itself and Leuz’s suggestion, as well 
as a general lack of direct evidence on cross-listing costs, this study extends existing 
research by investigating the major cross-listing cost of complying with U.S. GAAP by 
non-U.S. firms. Specifically, I examine the effect of U.S. GAAP compliance costs on 
non-U.S. firms’ cross-listing decisions, listing choices, and market valuations.   
While controversy persists over whether foreign registrants that follow the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) or the recent International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) should be allowed to enter the U.S. market without reconciling to the 
U.S. GAAP, the fact that more foreign firms have chosen to come to the U.S. seems to 
suggest that complying with U.S. GAAP may not be as big a concern as earlier.4  It is 
therefore interesting to explore whether the cross-listing phenomenon is attributable to 
the possible diminishing of differences between the U.S. and other national GAAPs 
                                                 
3 Among many articles are Siconolfi, C., and K. G. Salwen. “Big Board, SEC Fight over Foreign Stocks.” 
Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1992, p. C1, and Jarrell, G. “EC Crimps Big Board’s Future.” Wall Street 
Journal, June 19, 1992, p. A10 
4 It is noted that former SEC Chief Accountant, Don Nicolaisen, had proposed a "roadmap" to achieving 
the acceptance of IFRS in the U.S. without reconciliation, which would seem to question the relevance of 
the current study. However, as pointed out by Mary Barth, who is currently the board member of 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), we would still need to understand the costs (and 
benefits) of cross-listing.  
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(owing to the harmonization of international accounting standards around the world), 
and/or to the uniqueness of the U.S. capital market in its ability to generate benefits 
which exceed all cross-listing costs, including the professed high compliance costs.   
This study first examines whether meeting U.S. accounting and disclosure 
requirements impacts foreign firms’ cross-listing decisions.  Per Ashbaugh (2001), 
complying with U.S. GAAP (or IAS) is made up two parts: reconciliation and disclosure. 
Accordingly, I disentangle the U.S. GAAP compliance costs into two components: (1) 
reconciliation costs, i.e., costs incurred to follow specific U.S. accounting measurement 
methods, such as accounting for goodwill, and (2) disclosure costs, i.e., costs incurred to 
make disclosures required by the regulatory body which oversees the enforcement of that 
particular accounting standard, such as contingent liabilities. The nature of the costs can 
be preparation costs or information revelation costs. Using Worldscope data on individual 
firms’ 31 accounting policies,  I develop ways to measure these two constructs at the firm 
level, which extends Hope et al. (2005) who investigate the effect of disclosure 
environment of home country on foreign firms’ cross-listing activities.  
Next, for all firms that have cross-listed, I examine whether complying with U.S. 
accounting and disclosure rules affects their listing choices. Foreign firms can use one of 
four cross-listing options to tap U.S. capital markets: Rule 144a private placement, Level 
I, Level II or Level III ADRs (see section 2.1 ADR background for a detailed discussion). 
Each choice has different implications in terms of stock valuation, liquidity, visibility, 
registration requirement, regulatory scrutiny, and litigation threat.  In complying with U.S. 
GAAP, firms under Rule 144a or Level I (OTC) are generally exempt from the SEC 
filings and thus not required to conform to U.S. GAAP.  In contrast, Level II and III ADR 
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firms need to register with the SEC, which subjects them to the SEC’s regulatory 
oversight, including conforming to U.S. GAAP.  However, despite their low liquidity and 
visibility, Level I ADRs have been found to be the most popular type of listing and have 
enjoyed the largest growth (Frost and Lang 1996; Doidge et al. 2004).  I therefore 
investigate whether U.S. GAAP compliance deters ADR firms from listing on a major 
U.S. exchange.  Furthermore, it is possible that reconciliation and disclosure affect firms’ 
listing choices differently. A firm may not incur large costs in bringing its accounting 
practices to meet U.S. measurement rules, but may be unwilling to disclose sensitive 
information required by exchange listing, such as segment information, for fear that 
doing so would put the firm at a competitive disadvantage. Thus, the second test also 
looks at potential differential effects of reconciliation and disclosure on a firm’s listing 
choices.   
Finally, after obtaining proxies for firms’ compliance costs, I examine whether 
the magnitude of a cross-listed firm’s compliance costs has an impact on its valuation.  
Same as Doidge et al. (2004) and Hope et al. (2005), I use Tobin’s q to proxy for firms’ 
valuations.  Tobin’s q is computed by dividing (Total Assets – Book Value of Equity + 
Market Value of Equity) by Total Assets.  Doidge et al. (2004) find that at the end of 
1997, foreign companies with shares cross-listed in the U.S. had Tobin’s q ratios that 
were 16.5% higher than the q ratios of non cross-listed firms from the same country, and 
that the valuation difference reaches 37% for companies listed on major U.S. exchanges. 
Since we observe the net benefits (benefits – costs) of cross-listing and exchange-listing, 
it is interesting to explore whether a cross-listed firm’s compliance costs affect its 
valuation.  Hope et al. (2005) find that the valuation benefit for exchange-listed firms is 
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relatively lower for firms domiciled in a jurisdiction with relatively lower disclosure level 
(proxy by the country-level CIFAR scores5). This result suggests that home country 
disclosure practices of cross-listed firms matter to investors even after firms subject 
themselves to U.S. accounting rules and regulations. However, whether the firm-level 
compliance costs affect the values of cross-listed or exchange-listed firms is an empirical 
question and is examined in this paper.  
I find that complying with U.S. financial reporting requirements is a significant 
cost factor when non-U.S. firms decide whether they should issue or list their shares in 
the U.S.  This finding is in line with previous survey or case studies which recognize that 
the cost of complying with U.S. GAAP is an important consideration when foreign firms 
contemplate listing in the U.S.  However, the significance of compliance costs diminishes 
as foreign firms determine whether or not they should cross-list on an organized stock 
exchange where U.S. GAAP compliance is required.  It is possible that the benefits 
brought forth through cross-listing and particularly exchange-listing, as identified in prior 
literature, outweigh foreign firms’ compliance costs. The valuation analyses confirm the 
existence of these cross-listing and exchange-listing premiums. I further find that 
disclosure costs negatively affect the values of cross-listed firms; i.e., cross-listed firms 
that disclose less accounting information (incurring higher disclosure costs) are valued 
less by the market.  To some extent, exchange-listed firms that disclose less accounting 
information are also valued less by the market. These findings are consistent with the 
general theme in the literature that disclosure matters. 
                                                 
5 CIFAR is a disclosure index produced by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research 
which rates companies’ annual reports for their inclusion or exclusion of 85 items (see Appendix C) 
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Reconciliation is an important aspect of U.S. GAAP compliance.  But to my 
knowledge, no prior study has empirically examined the effect of reconciliation on 
foreign firms’ cross-listing decisions and listing choices.  In terms of the impact of 
disclosure, a few studies in Finance include CIFAR (the disclosure index) in the analyses 
of foreign firms’ cross-listing decisions and valuations (Reese and Weisbach 2002; 
Doidge et al. 2004).6  These researchers use CIFAR to proxy for accounting standards or 
shareholder protection in the home country. However, they do not consistently find 
CIFAR a statistically significant variable in foreign firms’ cross-listing attempt, which is 
in contrast to the common belief and evidence that complying with U.S. GAAP is a major 
undertaking.   
The use of CIFAR could be inconclusive because it does not capture foreign 
firms’ effort in reconciling their accounts to conform to U.S. accounting measurement 
rules.  It may also be inconclusive because the CIFAR index adopted in these studies is a 
country-level rather than a firm-level variable. As Hope (2003) notes, a limitation of 
using country-level disclosure scores is that the within-country variation in firm 
disclosures can be as great as between-country variation.7  Since a foreign firm’s decision 
to come to the U.S. market depends mainly on company-specific factors, the disclosure 
index constructed at the firm level in this study can better capture the effect of variation 
in firm-level disclosure on cross-listing decisions.  Further, as Pope (2003) points out, 
CIFAR is skewed toward the larger industrial firms within each country and toward 
                                                 
6 These studies use the 1991 CIFAR index which rates companies’ annual reports in 1990 for their 
inclusion or exclusion of 90 items. The 1993 and 1995 CIFAR indices are constructed from 85 annual 
report variables which are listed in Appendix C. 
7 Using country-level rather than firm-level disclosure scores, however, can potentially eliminate some 
noise in firm-level measures (Hope 2003).  Thus, I adopt CIFAR as a country-level control variable in this 
study. 
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industrialized countries with developed stock markets.  For instance, the 1993 CIFAR 
index is based on the study of 1991 annual reports of leading 978 industrial companies 
from 41 countries. 
Even though CIFAR has a total of 85 disclosure items (see Appendix C), only 20 
concern accounting policies, fewer than the 31 items that the disclosure index of current 
study provides (see Appendix B). As such, with more information on accounting method 
choices, the current index should reflect more fully a firm’s disclosure practice, which 
yields a better measure of disclosure costs.  
This study is related to two streams of research. One strand investigates the 
factors behind non-U.S. firms’ cross-listing behavior, such as Pagano, Roell and Zechner 
(2002), Reese and Weisbach (2002), Lang, Lins and Miller (2003), Doidge et al. (2004), 
and Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2005).  Another strand examines the differences in 
national accounting standards and the harmonization of international accounting 
standards, such as Saudagaran and Biddle (1992), Amir, Harris and Venuti (1993), Basu, 
Hwang and Jan (1998), Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001), and Bradshaw and Miller (2005). 
While this paper is closely related to Hope et al. (2005), it differs from their study by 
focusing on cost, offering a more comprehensive examination of U.S. GAAP compliance 
(reconciliation and disclosure), and measuring key variables at the firm level.   
This study contributes to the growing literature on cross-listing and international 
accounting by adding to our understanding of the role accounting plays in foreign firms’ 
U.S. cross-listing activities. As the accounting regulator and policy maker, the SEC faces 
choices regarding appropriate accounting and disclosure standards for foreign firms; its 
goal of protecting domestic investors from misleading financial information must be 
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weighed against demands for increased access to foreign investment opportunity. 
Meanwhile, the international integration of capital markets has led to unprecedented 
levels of competition among stock exchanges. Exchanges around the globe are trying to 
attract more foreign listings (Pagano et al. 2002).  As a result, U.S. regulators, accounting 
standard-setters, exchange officials, corporate managers, and investors should find the 
results interesting. 
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses ADR background and 
cross-listing theories. Section 3 develops the research design and hypotheses. Section 4 
presents variables and empirical models. Section 5 outlines data sources and sample 
selection procedures. Section 6 documents findings. Section 7 reports sensitivity analyses. 
Section 8 concludes with limitations and potential future research direction.   
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2.  BACKGROUND AND THEORIES  
2.1 ADR Background 
 An ADR is a negotiable receipt/certificate issued by a U.S. depository bank, such 
as the Bank of New York, that represents the shares of non-U.S. securities held by a 
depository’s custodian in the home market of non-U.S. companies.8  It was first 
developed in 1927 by J. P. Morgan as a means for U.S. investors to register and earn 
dividends on non-U.S. stock without direct access to the local market itself.  Over the 
years, the ADR has become a popular and primary vehicle for foreign firms to enter the 
U.S. capital markets, in conjunction with raising capital, mergers and acquisitions, 
restructurings, foreign government debt offerings, and employee benefit plans.9  Once an 
ADR program is established and registered with the SEC, the ADRs trade freely in the 
U.S. just like any other U.S. security. Each ADR share represents a multiple of the 
underlying foreign security, which permits the ADR to trade in an appropriate price range 
for the U.S. market. ADRs are quoted in U.S. dollars, their dividends are paid in U.S. 
dollars, and they settle just like any other U.S. security.  
 An overseas company considering entry into U.S. securities markets has a choice 
of four types of ADR instruments: one level of private placement and three levels of 
public placement.  Private offerings are commonly made under Rule 144a of the 
                                                 
8 There are two basic types of ADRs: unsponsored and sponsored. An unsponsored ADR program is 
created without active participation from the foreign private issuer of the deposited securities.  Since 1983 
when the SEC required company approval of all new ADR programs, no unsponsored ADRs have been set 
up. A sponsored ADR program is established jointly by a foreign private issuer and a depository, i.e., a 
foreign issuer sponsors its entry into the U.S. market by appointing a U.S. depository bank to be the sole 
agent of its ADRs.  
9 Foreign firms, such as some Canadian and Israeli firms, can choose to list their shares directly on U.S. 
stock exchanges. But the majority of them cross-list their stocks through ADR programs. The listing and 
reporting requirements for firms with direct listings are essentially the same as those for ADR firms. 
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Securities Act of 1933 (adopted in April 1990). This kind of capital-raising issue is 
privately sold to Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs10) with very limited liquidity.11 
Since it is a private placement, a company does not have to register under the Securities 
Act of 1993 (Securities Act) or the Securities Exchange Act of 1994 (Exchange Act). 
Thus, the company is exempt from conforming to the SEC’s accounting and disclosure 
requirements and most civil liability provisions. Financial statements are typically 
prepared in accordance with the home country’s accounting principles.  
 A public placement involves three types of sponsored ADRs:  Level I, Level II, 
and Level III.  A Level I ADR trades in the over-the-counter (OTC) market as OTC 
Bulletin Board or Pink Sheet issues and has limited liquidity. It cannot be listed on an 
exchange or used to raise capital. Under the information exemption of the Exchange Act, 
a company with Level I ADRs can obtain an exemption from registration. It is only 
required to supply the SEC with any material information produced and distributed 
locally in its home country. Since it is not fully registered with the SEC, the company 
does not have to comply with U.S. GAAP. Home-country accounting is allowed with 
adequate English translation, if necessary.  
Foreign firms listed via Level II ADRs must register with the SEC by submitting 
Form F-6 in accordance with the Exchange Act. Firms can trade their ADRs on one of 
the major U.S. exchanges: the NYSE, the American Exchange (AMEX), or the National 
Association of Securities Dealer’s Automation Quotation (NASDAQ) System. Besides 
                                                 
10 According to Rule 144a, there are thirteen separate categories of QIBs. In general, they are institutional 
investors with an excess of US$100 million in assets under management, not including government 
securities (Jensen 1994).  
11 PORTAL is the market where the trading of Rule 144a securities takes place among the QIBs.  PORTAL 
is an acronym for private offerings, resales, and trading through automated linkages. 
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following the reporting and disclosure requirements of the SEC, they also must meet the 
minimum listing standards and corporate governance requirements of the particular 
exchange on which they trade.12  Level III ADRs are similar to Level II ADRs; however, 
in addition to the listing, they can raise capital through issuing new shares. This capital- 
raising element requires them to register with the SEC via Form F-113 in accordance with 
the Securities Act. Firms with Level II and III ADRs are the exchange-listed firms. 
Registration with the SEC obligates Level II and III ADR firms to provide 
financial information under U.S. GAAP annually in Form 20-F within six months of the 
fiscal year-end, and periodically in Form 6-K.  Foreign firms with Level II and III ADRs 
can prepare their financial statements using U.S. GAAP directly, IAS or their home-
country GAAP, with a reconciliation of net income and stockholders’ equity figures 
equivalent to that under U.S. GAAP.  Where relevant, reconciliation of balance sheet 
accounts and discussion of other classification differences on the balance sheet and 
income statement are required. In addition, Form 20-F provides two sets of financial 
statement rules: Item 17 and Item 18.  For Item 17, disclosures that are required by U.S. 
GAAP but not local GAAP/IAS need not be furnished, such as the segment information. 
Item 18 is required for securities offerings (Level III ADRs). It typically calls for vastly 
expanded footnote disclosure, including virtually all required U.S. disclosure. Thus, Item 
                                                 
12 Each stock exchange sets its quantitative listing requirements. For example, the NYSE requires non-U.S. 
firms to have 5,000 shareholders worldwide, 2.5 million publicly held shares worldwide, $100 million 
public market value worldwide, aggregate three-year pre-tax earnings of $100 million, and a minimum of 
$25 million in earnings in each of the two most recent years (Hope et al. 2005). 
13 Form F-1 is a full-disclosure, long-form registration statement, analogous to the domestic Form S-1, 
which does not permit incorporation by reference, and therefore is the lengthiest, most detailed, and most 
expensive form of registration statement to prepare (Jensen 1994). In the case of subsequent offerings, 
Form F-2 and F-3 are used for Level III ADRs. 
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18 requires a more thorough adaptation of the financial statements to U.S. GAAP than  
Item 17.  Foreign firms may choose to report voluntarily to the SEC under Item 18.14   
 
2.2 Cross-Listing Theories 
 Although empirical archival research on the U.S. GAAP compliance costs has not 
been significant, many prior studies have proposed different theories explaining firms’ 
cross-listing behavior and identified potential factors in the decision process.  
The market segmentation hypothesis is one of the first theories presented by the 
researchers.  This hypothesis emphasizes the fact that the world markets are segmented 
by different kinds of barriers to capital flows, such as government controls on capital and 
foreign exchange, taxes, information constraints, language, cultural issues, and legal 
differences. The existence of these barriers causes an additional risk to be borne by stocks 
in a country that is segmented from foreign investors (Errunza and Losq 1985; Eun and 
Janakiramanan 1986). Theories of capital market integration (Stapleton and 
Subrahmanyam 1977; Alexander, Eun and Janakiramanan 1987) suggest that removing 
these barriers will allow the risk to be shared globally by more investors, leading to a 
reduction in the expected return demanded by investors and an increase in stock prices. 
Thus, market segmentation creates an incentive for non-U.S. firms to effectively reduce 
the investment barriers by listing their shares in the U.S. markets. Consistent with the 
                                                 
14 Foreign firms do not face exactly the same regulatory environment as U.S. firms do. U.S. requirements 
are less onerous for cross-listed firms than for domestic firms (Lang, Raedy and Yetman 2003). For 
instance, the reconciling items for bottom-line net income and shareholders’ equity can be at a fairly 
summary level. Foreign firms are exempt from proxy and insider trading provisions and regulation Fair 
Disclosure. Quarterly reporting is not required unless it is filed in their local jurisdictions. They can also 
wait for six months after fiscal year end to file annual reports (Form 20-F) versus 90 days for U.S. firms 
(Form 10-K). 
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predictions, the literature has documented a small positive reaction to the listing or the 
announcement of listing (Foerster and Karolyi 1999; Miller 1999) and a decline in the 
cost of capital after ADR listing (Errunza and Miller 2000).  Miller (1999) also finds that 
the influence of barriers is stronger in emerging markets. 
Merton’s (1987) investor recognition hypothesis is another conventional theory 
which states that investors consider only securities that they know, an assumption about 
incomplete information. Since investors consider only a part of the opportunity set, full 
diversification is not possible and thus firm-specific risk is priced at equilibrium. Firms 
with a relatively small shareholder base have incentives to incorporate policies that 
actively expand the investor base of the firm’s shares, including listing shares on foreign 
exchanges. Findings from Foerster and Karolyi (1999) provide direct empirical support to 
the hypothesis. Using analyst coverage and media attention as alternative measures of 
investor recognition, Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver (2002) also demonstrate that an 
increase in the size of the investment base lowers the cost of capital and increases the 
market value of shares, lending further support to the theory. 
 In surveys, corporate managers that have initiated overseas listings for their firms 
(Mittoo 1992; Fanto and Karmel 1997) often cite increased liquidity as a primary 
motivation. The liquidity hypothesis argues that since the U.S. capital markets are deep 
and liquid, a firm with an ADR listing can raise funds at a lower cost than at home, 
especially companies from emerging markets. Lins et al. (2005) document that the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flows declines significantly for firms from emerging 
capital markets, but the sensitivity does not change for firms from developed markets. 
Focusing on Mexican firms, Davis-Friday, Frecka and Riviera (2005) show that Mexican 
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ADR companies issue equity on U.S. exchanges to relax capital constraints which 
became very severe after the 1995 peso devaluation.  
Recently, evidence has emerged that challenges the traditional explanations of 
why firms pursue overseas listings. A new line of reasoning, the bonding hypothesis, has 
gained a lot of ground. This theory recognizes that in countries where legal protections 
for minority investors are weak or enforcement mechanisms are poor, firms find it 
considerably more difficult to raise external capital (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny 1997).  In such a situation, Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999) suggest that firms 
wishing to access external capital can bond themselves to protect the interests of minority 
investors through cross-listing in the U.S., because compliance with U.S. disclosure 
requirements, exposure to SEC enforcement, and the threat of shareholder litigation make 
it harder and more costly for controlling owners and managers to extract private control 
benefits from outside investors.  In addition, firms are subject to greater scrutiny and 
monitoring from the press and from reputable intermediaries such as U.S. underwriters 
(for Level III offerings), debt-rating agencies, auditors and analysts. 
 Studies adopting the bonding hypothesis have produced consistent support for the 
theory. For example, Reese and Weisbach (2002) document substantial patterns between 
cross-listing, subsequent equity offerings, and shareholder protection. They conclude that 
overseas firms cross-list in the U.S. to increase protection of their minority shareholders. 
Similarly, Doidge et al. (2004) find that growth opportunities are valued more highly for 
firms listed in the U.S., and that this valuation premium is negatively related to the level 
of investor protection in firms’ domicile countries. Further, Doidge (2004) shows that 
exchange-listed firms have a lower voting premium (proxy for private benefits of control) 
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than non cross-listed firms, and that the difference in voting premium is negatively 
related to measures of minority investor protection in a firm’s home country.  His results 
provide direct empirical support to the bonding hypothesis. 
  Finally, the signaling hypothesis is proposed by a number of researchers who 
posit that information considerations are a key factor in cross-listing decisions. Analytical 
models by Cantale (1996), Fuerst (1998) and Moel (1999) suggest that firms have 
incentive to list in the U.S. as an attempt to signal their private information on 
unobservable good qualities to outside investors. This incentive is particularly appealing 
for firms domiciled in low disclosure quality and low information trading environments. 
On the other hand, these firms can be viewed as “bonding” themselves to an increased 
level of disclosure required by the SEC.  In this case, the signaling argument may appear 
similar to the bonding hypothesis, although their underlying rationales are different.  
 Even though it is difficult to assess the relative importance of the theories in 
firms’ cross-listing considerations, the overall evidence points to the fact that listing in 
the U.S. is associated with many benefits, such as positive abnormal returns, decrease in 
the cost of capital, relaxation of capital constraints, lower private control benefits, 
improved firms’ visibility and information environment, and higher firm values.15
However, despite the recent surge in foreign firms cross-listed in the U.S., fewer 
than one in ten large public companies from outside the U.S. have actually chosen to do 
so (Doidge et al. 2004). Given the advantages of ADR listings discussed above, one may 
ask what inhibits more companies from coming to the U.S.  By directly examining the 
                                                 
15 In addition, through cross-listing, foreign firms can acquire target American companies, establish name 
recognition for their products, improve relations with local employees, and follow their industry peers to 
gain market shares in the U.S. (Pagano, Randl, Roell and Zechner 2001).   
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U.S. GAAP compliance costs at the firm level, this study complements prior research in 
understanding non-U.S. firms’ cross-listing considerations. 
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3.  RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
Prior literature has identified complying with U.S. GAAP as one of the most 
significant listing costs.  For instance, Biddle and Saudagaran (1989) claim that the initial 
listing and registration fees are relatively minor components of the cross-listing cost 
compared with the costs of meeting the accounting and disclosure requirements arising 
from differences in financial reporting and regulatory requirements between countries.  
Saudagaran and Biddle (1992) further conclude that the stringent U.S. disclosure 
requirement deters foreign companies from listing shares in the U.S.  Similarly, Mittoo 
(1992) surveys the managers of Canadian companies cross-listed in the U.S. and the U.K., 
finding that managers view the main costs of cross-listing as: (1) meeting the SEC 
reporting requirements (60.1% of the respondents); (2) legal and accounting fees (44.2%); 
and (3) listing fees (31.7%).16  In a case study which examines Daimler-Benz’s decision 
to list its existing shares on the NYSE in 1993, Radebaugh et al. (1995) state that the 
significant difference between German GAAP and U.S. GAAP is the main reason that 
relatively few German firms are listed in the U.S.17  Further, in a survey by Fanto and 
Karmel (1997) on the attitudes of foreign companies regarding U.S. listing, more than 
                                                 
16 It is interesting to note that Mittoo mailed the questionnaire to the sample Canadian companies in May 
1991. Shortly after, in July 1991, Canada and the U.S. implemented the Multijurisdictional Disclosure 
System (MJDS) which allows eligible Canadian firms to list and issue securities in the U.S. using the 
disclosure requirements of their home country.  Considering the SEC’s unwavering position in protecting 
U.S. investors by demanding U.S. GAAP compliance, it is reasonable to conjecture that the disclosures 
made by companies following the Canadian GAAP would not differ too much from those following the 
U.S. GAAP.  However, about 60% of Canadian managers surveyed still rate meeting the SEC reporting 
requirements as the main cost, which demonstrates that meeting U.S. accounting requirements is a costly 
undertaking by many firms. 
17 Daimler-Benz is the first German company to list on the NYSE. Many German companies were upset 
with Daimler-Benz for reconciling its financial statements to comply with U.S. GAAP. The Chief Financial 
Officers of some major German companies (Bayer, Siemens) stated that the listing was detrimental to the 
negotiations between the SEC and EU and German authorities over the potential adoption of mutual 
recognition and acceptance of German GAAP (Radebaugh et al. 1995).  
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half of the respondents consider accounting reconciliation time-consuming and expensive. 
Foreign managers also complained about the extensiveness of U.S. disclosure 
requirements.   
Even though much of the existing evidence is drawn from surveys of managers or 
case-oriented studies, a consistent theme emerges that the cost of meeting U.S. financial 
reporting requirements is a primary consideration as foreign firms contemplate U.S. 
listing. Therefore, my general hypothesis is that the cost of complying with U.S. GAAP 
negatively affects non-U.S. firms’ cross-listing attempts.  
Ashbaugh (2001) suggests that each set of accounting standards is a unique 
combination of accounting measurement policies and disclosure.  Specifically, Ashbaugh 
investigates factors associated with non-U.S. firms’ voluntary reporting of financial 
information prepared in accordance with IAS or U.S. GAAP.  She identifies the 
following three reasons for voluntary reporting: (1) to communicate with foreign 
financial information users, which is proxy by the number of foreign equity markets in 
which a firm’s shares trade; (2) to facilitate raising equity capital; and (3) to provide more 
standardized financial information in the annual financial report, which is proxy by the 
deviation of domestic GAAP from IAS or U.S. GAAP in terms of accounting method 
choices and disclosure requirements. She finds that non-U.S. firms are more likely to 
disclose IAS or U.S. GAAP financial information as their shares trade in more equity 
markets and/or when by doing so they can provide more standardized financial 
information relative to the information generated via their domestic GAAPs. She also 
finds that firms are more likely to disclose IAS financial information when U.S. GAAP 
requires more accounting policy changes to the disclosure required under firms’ domestic 
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GAAPs.  Her results suggest that non-U.S. firms report IAS financial information to 
receive some benefits of providing more standardized financial information at costs less 
than those incurred to implement U.S. GAAP, which provides empirical support to the 
general hypothesis of this paper.  
Ashbaugh (2001) states that firms incur differential costs to disclose IAS or U.S. 
financial information since not all firms report such information in their annual reports. 
The more restrictive IAS or U.S. GAAP accounting measurement methods are (relative to 
domestic GAAPs), the more costly it is for firms to report standardized measures of net 
income and stockholders’ equity.18  Explicit costs are due, in part, to the information 
collection and processing costs incurred by converting a domestic GAAP accounting 
system into a system that produces earnings and stockholders’ equity in conformity with 
IAS or U.S. GAAP.  In addition, the increase in required disclosures can impose costs on 
firms.  Firms incur out-of-pocket costs to produce additional disclosures if the data are 
not already produced for internal reporting purposes. The additional disclosures may also 
impose implicit costs on a firm if such disclosures place a firm at a competitive 
disadvantage when competitors do not publish similar information. Hence, for some 
firms, the costs will dominate the perceived benefits associated with reporting IAS or U.S. 
GAAP.19   
                                                 
18 Both IAS and U.S. GAAP are considered to be more restrictive than domestic GAAPs in instances when 
they allow fewer acceptable methods of accounting for an economic event relative to the methods 
acceptable under domestic GAAPs.  For example, a French firm may elect to capitalize leases in its 
consolidated financial statements. IAS requires leases to be capitalized when substantially all the risks and 
rewards incident to ownership are transferred to the lessee. Thus, lease accounting under IAS is judged to 
be more constrained than under French GAAP. 
19 In another study, Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) examine the impact of differences in countries’ 
accounting standards relative to IAS on the accuracy of financial analyst earnings forecasts for a sample of 
non-U.S. firms before and after they adopt IAS.  Similarly, they develop indices that reflect differences in 
countries’ measurement and disclosure policies relative to IAS.  
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The same argument can be applied to assessing non-U.S. firms’ efforts in 
conforming to U.S. accounting and disclosure standards when faced with cross-listing 
options.  Specifically, I separate the U.S. GAAP compliance into two components: 
reconciliation and disclosure.  Evidence from previous studies leads me to predict that 
when cross-listing benefits are the same, a firm’s reconciliation costs and disclosure 
costs will each negatively affect the firm’s decision to cross-list in the U.S.  Thus, the 
first hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
H1: Non-U.S. firms with higher reconciliation costs and/or higher disclosure 
costs will be less likely to cross-list in the U.S., ceteris paribus. 
 
 
Previous research on different types of ADR programs shows that only the 
exchange-listed firms (Level II and Level III ADRs) incur the cost of following the 
accounting rules and regulations in the U.S.  In contrast, firms that trade over-the-counter 
as pink sheets (Level I ADRs) or place shares privately to QIBs (Rule 144a) are not 
required to comply with U.S. GAAP, and thus need not incur the reconciliation and 
disclosure costs. Therefore, I predict, holding the cross-listing benefits constant, that an 
ADR firm’s reconciliation costs and disclosure costs will each negatively affect its 
decision to list on a major U.S. exchange.20  Thus, the second hypothesis is formulated as 
follows: 
   
H2: Cross-listed firms with higher reconciliation costs and/or disclosure costs 
will be less likely to list on an organized exchange, ceteris paribus. 
 
                                                 
20 Some firms may choose to start from Level I ADR or Rule 144a and later upgrade to Level II or Level III 
ADR programs. If these firms are at the non exchange-listed stage but voluntarily choose to fully or 
partially comply with U.S. GAAP (for the purpose of future upgrade or other considerations), their actions 
would bias against finding the results. 
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I next investigate whether the valuation of a cross-listed or an exchange-listed 
firm is affected by the magnitude of its firm-level reconciliation costs and disclosure 
costs. According to Hope et al. (2005), the disclosure level of the home country (proxy by 
CIFAR) has an impact on the valuation of exchange-listed firms; i.e., firms domiciled in 
a higher disclosure regime generally receive a higher valuation (Tobin’s q). Extending 
their research, I include firm-level reconciliation costs and disclosure costs in the 
valuation model to examine if these costs matter to investors.     
Prior research on the value-relevance21 of non-U.S. firms’ Form 20-F 
reconciliation, as summarized in studies such as Pownall and Schipper (1999), has 
generated mixed results.  For instance, Amir et al. (1993) find that U.S. GAAP 
reconciliations of firms’ home country GAAP accounting numbers are value-relevant.  
On the other hand, Chan and Seow (1996) show that earnings prepared under firms’ 
home-country GAAP are value-relevant to U.S. investors and that they are even more 
value-relevant than U.S.GAAP-based accounting information.  In another line of research 
that examines accounting quality, Lang, Raedy and Yetman (2003) document that cross-
listed firms appear to be less aggressive in managing earnings compared to a matched 
sample of foreign firms currently not cross-listed in the U.S. However, when compared 
with a matched sample of U.S. firms, cross-listed firms have reconciled earnings that 
                                                 
21 Value-relevance studies refer to numerous accounting papers that investigate the empirical relation 
between stock market values (or change in values) and particular accounting numbers. Holthausen and 
Watts (2001) classify the value-relevance studies into three categories: (1) relative association studies 
compare the association between stock market values (or change in values) and alternative bottom-line 
measures; (2) incremental association studies investigate whether the accounting number of interest is 
helpful in explaining value or returns (over long windows) given other specified variables; (3) marginal 
information content studies investigate whether a particular accounting number adds to the information set 
available to investors. 
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differ systematically from U.S. GAAP earnings for U.S. firms and are characterized by 
more evidence of earnings management (Lang, Raedy and Wilson 2005). 
Previous studies have documented the association between disclosure level and 
the cost of capital (Botosan 1997; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000).  In terms of the valuation 
effect of increased disclosure, Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) show that cross-listed firms 
enjoy a better information environment than non cross-listed firms and thus have higher 
market values. The authors attribute the improved information environment to cross-
listed firms’ voluntary bonding of themselves to an increased level of disclosure and the 
scrutiny of the U.S. market.   
However, whether the values of ADR firms are affected by the firm-specific 
disclosure costs remains to be examined.  In their investigation of why cross-listed firms 
are worth more, Doidge et al. (2004) include home country disclosure level (proxy by 
CIFAR) as a control variable, but they do not consistently find disclosure a significant 
variable. On the other hand, Hope et al. (2005) show that there is a valuation benefit for 
cross-listing on an organized exchange which mandates high disclosures, and that the 
benefit is smaller for firms domiciled in a jurisdiction with a relatively lower disclosure 
level (proxy by CIFAR), even though it is more costly for these firms to list on an 
organized exchange.  
Due to the lack of obvious direction in the relation between a cross-listed firm’s 
value and the effort it makes to conform to U.S. GAAP (reconciliation and disclosure), 




H3: There is no systematic difference in valuations between cross-listed firms 
(exchange-listed firms) incurring higher reconciliation and/or disclosure 
costs and cross-listed firms (exchange-listed firms) incurring lower 
reconciliation and/or disclosure costs. 
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4.  VARIABLES AND EMPIRICAL MODELS 
4.1 Test Variables 
To operationalize the reconciliation construct, I adopt a metric of 13 accounting 
policies developed by Bradshaw and Miller (2005)22  (see Appendix A).  By comparing a 
firm’s individual accounting policies to the respective U.S. standard, I obtain a score 
describing the distance of a firm’s accounting method choices from the U.S. benchmarks. 
The more items that are different, the higher the reconciliation costs, as more effort and 
time are needed to convert accounting information suiting a home standard to the U.S. 
standard.  Furthermore, companies domiciled in a code-law country may incur higher 
costs following U.S. accounting policies because income numbers prepared according to 
U.S. standards reflect the demand for accounting information in a common-law setting, 
exhibiting the properties of timeliness and conservatism (Ball, Kothari and Robin 
2000).23  In a code-law country, however, these properties are not associated with 
accounting. Thus, it is reasonable to conjecture that the cross-sectional variation in the 
reconciliation costs is primarily determined by two things: (1) at the country level, the 
similarity between the home country GAAP and the U.S. GAAP; (2) at the individual 
firm level, managers’ choice of accounting policy, provided that they have the discretion 
to choose among different accounting methods, including ones compliant with the U.S. 
standards (Basu et al. 1998). 
                                                 
22 This metric is validated by the authors and is further used in Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller (2004) which 
examines the relation between foreign firms’ accounting method choices and the investment made by U.S. 
institutional investors in foreign firms.  
23 For example, in 1993 when Daimler-Benz became the first German company to cross-list in the U.S., the 
net income reported under the German GAAP (a code-law country) was DM 615 million.  However, a net 
loss of DM 1,839 million was reported under the U.S. GAAP (Radebaugh et al. 1995). 
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I measure the disclosure component of U.S. GAAP compliance by developing a 
metric based on whether a firm provides information on two groups of items: (1) 29 
accounting method choices24, and (2) auditor and auditor’s opinion (see Appendix B). All 
of these are data fields identified in the Worldscope database.  
This disclosure metric constructed at the firm level is different from the CIFAR 
scores obtained at the country level. Hope et al. (2005) use CIFAR to proxy for the 
disclosure environment of the home country. They find that firms from a weak disclosure 
environment (low CIFAR scores) are more likely to cross-list but less likely to list on an 
organized exchange where foreign firms are required to comply with U.S. GAAP.  
 
4.2 Cross-Listing Decisions 
I test non-U.S. firms’ cross-listing decisions (H1) by estimating the following 
logit model:  
 
CL =  α0 + α1Reconcile + α2Disclosure + α3CIFAR + α4InvestProtec + 
α5EmergM + α6Liquidity + α7LogGNP + α8Size + α9Growth + 
α10Leverage + α11Industry + ε             (1) 
 
The dependent variable CL is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a 
firm cross-lists in the U.S. and zero otherwise. Two variables of interest are Reconcile 
and Disclosure. Reconcile represents the reconciliation costs incurred by a firm to bring 
its accounting numbers in line with U.S. GAAP.  I examine each of the 13 accounting 
                                                 
24 The previous 13 accounting method choices are taken from these choices.  
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policy choices (see Appendix A) against their respective U.S. standards.  If a foreign 
firm’s accounting practice is different from that of the U.S., I assign one point for that 
item, indicating that it is more costly for the firm to comply with U.S. GAAP in that area.  
After adding up these one points (total number of noncompliance items found), I divide 
the sum by 13 (total number of items in question) to get the value of Reconcile.  As such, 
Reconcile is a ratio that ranges from 0 (100% compliance) to 1 (100% noncompliance). 
As the value of Reconcile increases, the reconciliation costs are expected to increase 
accordingly.  Similarly, Disclosure is a proxy for firms’ potential cost of following the 
required U.S. reporting rules to make information available to investors.  I examine the 
availability of 31 items as listed on Appendix B.  If a foreign firm does not disclose one 
of the 31 items, I assign one point for that particular item. After adding up all these one 
points (total number of non-disclosed items found), I divide the sum by 31 (total number 
of items in question) to get the value of Disclosure.25  As such, Disclosure is a ratio that 
ranges from 0 (100% disclosed) to 1 (100% non-disclosed). As the value of Disclosure 
increases, the disclosure costs are expected to increase. According to H1, a negative sign 
is predicted for these two test variables. 
 Based on prior research, I include several country-level and firm-level variables in 
equation (1) to control for factors expected to influence a firm’s cross-listing decision.  
At the country level, CIFAR is included to reflect home-country disclosure environment. 
Consistent with Hope et al. (2005), a negative sign is expected.  InvestProtec is a proxy 
for shareholder protection in the home country.  I adopt three separate measures from La 
                                                 
25 Not all items are applicable for some firms. For example, the inventory costing method in general does 
not apply to firms in the banking industry.  In such cases, I count only items that are applicable to the firms 
and adjust the denominators by excluding the number of non-applicable items.   
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Porta et al. (1997, 1998): (1) legal tradition of the home country (French, German, 
Scandinavian Civil Law, or English Common Law); (2) an index of anti-director rights, 
which aggregates six important shareholder rights within countries; (3) an index of 
judicial efficiency.26  Since firms from emerging markets face more capital constraints 
than those from developed markets (Miller 1999; Lins et al. 2005; Frost, Gordon and 
Pownall 2005), I include a dummy variable EmergM which receives the value of one if a 
firm’s home market is classified as emerging by the International Finance Corporation, 
and zero if classified as developed.  Liquidity, a ratio of the dollar value of shares traded 
by the average market capitalization in 1997, is used to control for the liquidity of the 
capital market in the home country.  I also use the log of GNP (LogGNP) of the firm’s 
domicile to control for the size of the firm’s home market since firms from smaller 
markets potentially have a greater incentive to access the larger U.S. investor base. 
 At the firm-level, Size is included, which equals the log of assets in millions of 
U.S. dollars. Since valuable growth opportunities motivate firms to engage in cross-
listing activities (Doidge et al. 2004), variable Growth is included which equals the 
percentage of a firm’s net sales growth.  Leverage reflects firms’ demand for external 
capital and is computed as the percentage of long-term debt over common equity. Finally, 
Industry is firms’ industry membership classified according to 1-digit SIC code. 
 
                                                 
26 According to La Porta et al. (1998), the anti-director index is formed by adding 1 when (1) the country 
allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their 
shares prior to the general shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of 
minorities in the board of directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the 
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ 
meeting is less than or equal to 10% (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that 
can be waived only by a shareholders’ vote. The index ranges from zero to six.  The judicial efficiency 
measures the degree of effectiveness of legal system on a scale of one (low) to ten (high). 
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4.3 Cross-Listing Choices 
 Similar to estimating equation (1), I use a logit model to test cross-listed firms’ 
listing choices (H2):  
 
EX_CL = α0 + α1Reconcile + α2Disclosure + α3CIFAR + α4InvestProtec +  
    α5EmergM + α6Liquidity + α7LogGNP + α8Size + α9Growth +  
   α10Leverage + α11Industry + ε             (2) 
 
The dependent variable, EX_CL, takes the value of one if a firm cross-lists on a 
major U.S. exchange (NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ), and zero if a firm cross-lists under 
Rule 144a or trades over-the-counter (Level I ADR). The exchange-listed firms are the 
Level II and Level III ADR firms, which are required to follow the U.S. accounting and 
disclosure requirements. As H2 predicts, the two test variables, Reconcile and Disclosure, 
are expected to have negative signs.  Based on the findings of Hope et al. (2005), CIFAR 
should have a positive sign as managers of firms domiciled in a better disclosure 
environment are less concerned about their loss of private control benefits as a result of 
complying with U.S. financial reporting requirements.  The sign predictions for the rest 
of the variables are the same as those under equation (1). 
 
4.4 Valuation 
 H3 investigates whether cross-listed (exchange-listed) firms incurring higher 
compliance costs are valued differently from those incurring lower compliance costs. 
Tobin’s q is employed as the dependent variable in the regression which is computed by 
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dividing (Total Assets – Book Value of Equity + Market Value of Equity) by Total 
Assets.27  CL and EX_CL now become the independent variables, in order to recognize 
the premium associated with cross-listing, and to show that the premium is larger for 
exchange-listed firms (Miller 1999; Doidge et al. 2004).  Consequently, I run two 
separate tests adopting the OLS regression framework, one on cross-listed vs. non cross-
listed firms, and the other on exchange-listed vs. non exchange-listed firms.  Equation (3a) 
tests the cross-listing effect and equation (3b) tests the exchange-listing effect.   
 
Tobin’s q = α0 + α1CL + α2Reconcile + α3Dislosure + α4CL*Reconcile  
 + α5CL*Disclosure + α6CIFAR + α7InvestProtec + α8Liquidity 
  + α9Growth + α10ROA + ε          (3a) 
 
Tobin’s q = α0 + α1EX_CL + α2Reconcile + α3Dislosure + α4EX_CL*Reconcile  
 + α5EX_CL*Disclosure + α6CIFAR + α7InvestProtec + α8Liquidity 
  + α9Growth + α10ROA + ε          (3b) 
 
The interaction terms CL*Reconcile and CL*Disclosure (EX_CL*Reconcile and 
EX_CL*Disclosure) are the points of test interest, demonstrating whether the valuation 
impact of cross-listing (exchange-listing) varies systematically with firm-specific 
compliance costs.  I include CIFAR in the regression to account for the effect of home 
                                                 
27 Tobin’s q has been widely used in this stream of research, such as Lang et al. (2003), Doidge et al. 
(2004), and Hope et al. (2005). 
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country disclosure environment on firms’ valuations. I also include Growth and ROA to 
control for the effects of firms’ growth and profitability on their valuations.  
I recognize the endogeneity issue regarding the above valuation models.  As prior 
studies have shown, foreign firms that are cross-listed or exchange-listed have higher 
Tobin’s q values.  However, it is likely that firms that are better valued by the market 
tend to cross-list or exchange-list more. To solve this potential simultaneity problem, I 
could instead use an instrumental variables framework. An instrumental variable is 
required to be related to the independent variable CL (EX_CL) but not related to the 
dependent variable Tobin’s q; i.e., it must only be related to Tobin’s q through its 
influence on CL (EX_CL).  It is difficult to come up with a good instrumental variable 
that would satisfy these conditions.  In addition, since CL (EX_CL) interacts with two 
other independent variables Reconcile and Disclosure, additional instrumental variables 
are needed in order to break down the simultaneity or those interactions must be left out.  
As a result, finding a number of proper instruments presents a real challenge for the 
current study and remains to be explored in future research.   
Another way to alleviate the endogeneity concerns is through the use of lagged 
variables.  Instead of using the Tobin’s q of year 1999, I could use the dependent variable 
for one year ahead, i.e., Tobin’s q of year 2000, but keep all the independent variables at 
their values of year 1999.  However, since data on Tobin’s q for year 2000 are not 
available at this point, future research will have to undertake this option. 
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Due to the inability to instrument for the cross-listing and exchange-listing 
variables as well as the data unavailability of lagged dependent variable, endogeneity 
remains a concern for the current study.  The consequence of estimating an equation with 
the potential endogeneity problem through the OLS method is that the OLS estimators 
thus obtained are not consistent; they do not converge to their true population values no 
matter how large the sample size is.  In this case, the results from estimating equation (3) 
should be interpreted with caution. 
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5.  SAMPLE AND DATA SOURCES 
 I obtain sample firms from the Worldscope Global Compact D.  Since 
Worldscope stopped collecting the complete set of accounting policies in August 2001, I 
use 1999 as the sample cutoff year because it gives me the largest number of firms that 
have the accounting policy information available on the Worldscope CDs.28  The initial 
sample of 14,376 firms is taken from the June 2000 and June 2001 CDs.  I exclude 947 
firms because they do not have country-level variables such as CIFAR or investor 
protection measures.  I then exclude 5,025 firms that had total assets less than US $100 
million, which is the same size cutoff point adopted by Doidge et al. (2004) and Hope et 
al. (2005).  I also lose 865 firms that did not disclose their accounting method choices.  I 
further exclude 813 firms that have missing information on firm-level variables such as 
total assets, growth rates or leverage. Finally, 72 non-U.S. firms indicated that they 
followed U.S. GAAP as their accounting standards, the exclusion of which gives me a 
final sample size of 6,654 firms. Table 1 (all tables are located in Appendix E) 
summarizes the sample selection procedure.  
 I obtain the recent list of cross-listed firms from the websites of the Bank of New 
York (www.adrbny.com) and JP Morgan’s “ADR Universe” (www.adr.com).  Most 
ADR firms’ starting dates of cross-listing activities are provided there.  I check each 
sample firm against this list to determine its cross-listing status as of December 31, 1999. 
A total of 533 cross-listed firms are identified. Among them, 111 firms were traded under 
Rule 144a, 289 firms were traded over the counter (Level I ADR), 74 were Level II ADR 
                                                 
28 Per communication with Worldscope, it stopped collecting information on accounting policies as of 
August 2001except for three items: accounting method for long term investment > 50%, accounting 
standards followed, and auditor’s opinion. Hence, the June 2001 CD is the latest version I can rely on to 
compute firms’ U.S. GAAP compliance costs.  
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firms and 59 were Level III ADR firms (both Level II and Level III firms were listed on 
one of the major stock exchanges in the U.S.), and 6,121 firms were not cross-listed in 
the U.S. as of December 31, 1999.29  The sample represents firms from 35 countries.  
Table 2 gives the distribution of firms by countries and listing modes. The description of 
country-level variables used in this study is tabulated in Table 3.  Variable descriptions 
are provided in Appendix D.  
 
                                                 
29 Some foreign firms became cross-listed after 1999.  I did not exclude these firms from the sample, which 
should work against finding the results. 
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6.  RESULTS 
6.1 Univariate Analyses 
 The descriptive statistics in Table 4 show that about 8% of the sample firms were 
ADR firms, which is consistent with the statement that less than one out of ten publicly-
held companies are cross-listed (Doidge et al. 2004).  Among all the sample firms, 2%  
were listed on one of the major U.S. stock exchanges. On average, firms were about 23% 
noncompliant with U.S. GAAP in terms of the 13 accounting policies (Reconcile) and did 
not disclose about 36% of their accounting method choices on the 31 items identified in 
the paper (Disclosure).  
 
6.1.1 Cross-Listing Decisions 
    Table 5 reports the means and medians of regression variables for cross-listed and 
non cross-listed firms and compares the differences between these two groups of firms. 
Specifically, the mean (median) of Reconcile for non cross-listed firms is 0.23 (0.22), 
which is higher than the mean (median) of 0.20 (0.20) for cross-listed firms. Similarly, 
for Disclosure, non cross-listed firms have higher mean (median) value, 0.37 (0.35), than 
that of cross-listed firms, 0.31 (0.29). The differences in both means and medians are 
statistically significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that, in general, cross-listed firms incurred 
lower Reconcile and Disclosure costs relative to non cross-listed firms.  In terms of the 
country-level disclosure scores, the mean of CIFAR of non cross-listed firms (73.23) is 
greater than that of cross-listed firms (71.99) and their difference is statistically 
significant (p < 0.01).  This difference is consistent with the findings of Doidge et al. 
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(2004) and Hope et al. (2005) that firms from a lower disclosure environment are more 
likely to cross-list. 
The mean and median comparisons also show that the average score of judicial 
efficiency for cross-listed firms (8.46) is statistically significantly (p < 0.01) lower than 
that of non cross-listed firms (9.04).  This evidence lends support to the bonding 
hypothesis which states that non-U.S. firms from countries where enforcement 
mechanism is weak raise external capital through cross-listing by subjecting themselves 
to the U.S. laws and regulations to protect the interest of minority shareholders. The 
mean difference of the anti-director rights index between non cross-listed and cross-listed 
firms is not statistically significant, but the legal tradition of the home country (common 
law vs. code law) appears to be an important factor, as the legal origins of cross-listed 
firms are different from those of non cross-listed firms at the means for all four groups (p 
< 0.1). 
Table 5 further indicates that about 37% of cross-listed firms are from an 
emerging market economy, while only 18% of non cross-listed firms domicile in an 
emerging market. This difference shows that non-U.S. firms originating from an 
emerging market economy (which has more capital constraints) tend to cross-list more. 
This piece of evidence is consistent with the liquidity hypothesis’ main motive of cross-
listing: to relax the capital constraints in the home country. Concerning the Liquidity of 
the capital market, cross-listed firms seem to come from a more liquid market.  I use 
LogGNP to proxy for the size of the home market. Compared with non cross-listed firms, 
cross-listed firms tend to domicile in a smaller market, which provides support to the 
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investor recognition hypothesis. The means of LogGNP are 6.81 and 6.23, respectively, 
and they are statistically different at p < 0.01.  
At the firm level, cross-listed firms are larger, which is proxy by the log of total 
assets in millions. The average size of cross-listed firms is 6.52, as opposed to 5.84, the 
mean size of non cross-listed firms. The difference is statistically significant with p < 
0.01.  Cross-listed firms also have higher growth rate, measured by the percentage of net 
sales growth. Specifically, cross-listed firms’ sales increase by 13.81% on average, while 
the sales increase for non cross-listed firms is only 8.10%. The difference in growth is 
consistent with the finding by Doidge et al. (2004) that a U.S. listing improves a firm’s 
ability to take advantage of its growth opportunities.  In addition, cross-listed firms are 
more leveraged than non cross-listed firms, but the difference is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels.  In terms of the profitability, which is measured by 
ROA, cross-listed firms are more profitable than non cross-listed firms. Their means are 
6.28% and 3.95%, respectively, and the difference is statistically significant (p < 0.01). 
 
6.1.2 Cross-Listing Choices 
 Table 6 presents the means and medians comparison of exchange-listed firms and 
other cross-listed firms that are not exchange-listed.  The mean of Reconcile for 
exchange-listed firms is 0.19, lower than the mean of 0.21 for non exchange-listed firms. 
However, the difference is not statistically different from zero. Similarly, exchange-listed 
firms tend to have lower Disclosure value, relative to non exchange-listed firms. The 
means (medians) of Disclosure for exchange-listed and non exchange-listed firms are 
0.28 (0.29) and 0.32 (0.32), respectively. The differences in means and medians are both 
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statistically significant at p < 0.01, suggesting that firms disclosing more information 
under their home country GAAPs are more likely to list on a U.S. exchange. Consistent 
with Hope et al. (2005), exchange-listed firms have higher average CIFAR score (75.23) 
than non exchange-listed firms (70.92), indicating that firms from a lower disclosure 
regime are less likely to list on an organized exchange where U.S. GAAP compliance is 
required.   
In terms of the investor protection variables, only F_Law and G_Law have means 
that are statistically different between the two groups.  In particular, among the 133 
exchange-listed firms, 46% of them domicile in a French code law country, while 18% of 
the 400 non exchange-listed firms have the French code law as their legal origin.  On the 
contrary, 9% of exchange-listed firms originate from a German code law country, while 
34% of non exchange-listed firms have the German code law tradition.  
The mean and median comparison of Table 6 further shows that exchange-listed 
firms tend to come from a home capital market that has lower liquidity, measured by the 
dollar value of shares traded over the average market capitalization. The mean values of 
Liquidity for exchange-listed and non exchange-listed firms are 0.63 and 0.85, 
respectively. The difference is statistically significant (p < 0.01).  Out of the 133 
exchange-listed firms, 59 are the capital-raising Level III ADRs, so the smaller Liquidity 
value of the exchange-listed group could be driven by the low liquidity at the home 
markets of the Level III ADR firms. This piece of evidence provides further support to 
the liquidity hypothesis which argues that foreign firms can raise funds at lower cost via 
ADR programs because U.S. capital markets are deep and liquid.   
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At the firm level, in general, exchange-listed firms are larger than non exchange-
listed firms. Their respective means of size are 6.83 and 6.41, statistically different at p < 
0.01.  Exchange-listed firms are also more profitable (ROA equals 7.78) than non 
exchange-listed firms (ROA equals 5.78). But exchange-listed firms are not necessarily 
the growth firms or more leveraged firms.  
 Table 7 Panel A presents the correlation matrix of the regression variables. Two 
test variables Reconcile and Disclosure are positively correlated with each other, but the 
correlation is not strong (ρ = 0.21). They are not highly correlated with other control 
variables either. But CIFAR is positively correlated with anti-director rights and judicial 
efficiency measures and negatively correlated with Liquidity (p < 0.01). Emerging market 
variable is negatively correlated with judicial efficiency index and the size of the home 
market (LogGNP), and the last two variables are also positively correlated with each 
other (p < 0.01).   
To determine the potential impact of these correlations on multivariate tests, I 
calculate the variance inflation factors30 (VIFs) of the independent variables.31 A 
representative VIFs analysis is presented in Table 7 Panel B.  In general, the VIF scores 
are not particularly high. Thus, it appears that there is no strong multicollinearity problem.  
 Overall, the above univariate analyses provide support for H1 and the disclosure 
aspect of H2.  
 
                                                 
30 The variance inflation factor (VIF) is the reciprocal of the tolerance which equals 1 – R2 for each variable. 
VIF represents the inflation in the variance of the parameter due to collinearity. 
31 I apply the linear probability model (LPM) to the multivariate analysis of firms’ cross-listing decisions 
before computing the VIF scores.  
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6.2 Multivariate Analyses 
6.2.1 Cross-Listing Decisions 
 Table 8 reports the results from estimating equation (1) which assesses the 
probability of cross-listing in the U.S by foreign firms.  I specify three models, each of 
which has 6,654 firms as the sample size.  Model 1 includes two test variables measured 
at the firm level, Reconcile and Disclosure, and country-level variables CIFAR and 
InvestProtec.  Model 2 adds EmergM, Liquidity and LogGNP as three more country-level 
variables and Size as one firm-level variable.  Model 3 includes two more variables at the 
firm level, Growth and Leverage, as well as six industry dummies.  
The logit regression is adopted with CL being the dependent variable. As Table 8 
shows, the explanatory power (pseudo R2) of the models ranges from 8.3% to 23.6%, 
depending on the specifications. Consistent with H1, the coefficients on the two test 
variables Reconcile and Disclosure are both negative and significant across all three 
models, although the significance levels of the coefficients drop as more control variables 
are added under model 2 and model 3.  The overall results indicate that firms incurring 
higher U.S. GAAP compliance costs are less likely to cross-list. Specifically, for model 3, 
the raw coefficients on Reconcile and Disclosure are -0.686 and -1.239, respectively. 
They are statistically different from zero at the conventional levels.  
To better explain the impact of Reconcile and Disclosure on cross-listing 
decisions, I conduct the marginal effect analysis (dy/dx) to show the impact of one unit 
change in the independent variable (from 0 to 1) on one unit change of the dependent 
variable (from 0 to 1), which is the change in cross-listing probability (from non cross-
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listing to cross-listing).32  Table 8 lists the marginal effect coefficients along with the raw 
coefficients.  In the full model, the coefficient on Reconcile is -0.024, suggesting that if a 
non-U.S. firm changes its 13 accounting policies from being fully non-compliant with 
U.S. GAAP to being fully compliant with U.S. GAAP (i.e., Reconcile changes from 1 to 
0), the predicted probability of cross-listing would increase by 2.4 percentage points, or 
30% (2.4/8), based on the evidence that the average probability of cross-listing is 8% (the 
mean value of CL equals 0.08).  In other words,  each accounting method change to 
become compliant with U.S. accounting practices (1/13 increase) would increase the 
predicted probability of cross-listing by 0.185 percentage points (0.024 x 1/13), which is 
equivalent to a 2.3% (0.185/8) increase in cross-listing probability.  
Likewise, the coefficient on Disclosure is -0.043, suggesting that a change by a 
foreign firm from the state of full non-disclosure on the 31 accounting policies to full 
disclosure (i.e., Disclosure changes from 1 to 0) would increase its cross-listing 
probability by 4.3 percentage points, or 54% (4.3/8), based on the evidence that 8% of 
sample firms in the current study chose to cross-list in the U.S.  In other words, increased 
disclosure on each accounting policy (1/31 increase) would increase the predicted cross-
listing probability by 0.139 percentage points (0.043 x 1/31), or 1.74% (0.139/8). 
Table 8 further shows that the coefficient on CIFAR stays negative and significant 
across all three specifications, indicating that firms originating from a lower disclosure 
regime are more likely to cross-list. This result is consistent with the findings of Doidge 
et al. (2004) and Hope et al. (2005). The coefficient on the anti-director rights variable is 
                                                 
32After running the logit regression, I use the Stata command “mfx compute” to obtain the marginal effect 
of each independent variable and the overall probability of the dependent variable.  
 41
positively significant for all three models (equals 0.238 for model 3), which suggests that 
firms domiciled in a country providing stronger investor protection would have higher 
probability of cross-listing in the U.S.33  The coefficients on the three dummy variables 
of legal origin, F_Law, G_Law and S_Law (code law tradition) are all negative and in 
general significant for all three specifications, suggesting that foreign firms from the 
common law countries tend to cross-list more than those from the code law countries.   
   The coefficient on EmergM is 0.618, positive and highly significant (p = 0.00), 
which is in line with the findings from univariate analyses that firms domiciled in an 
emerging market economy tend to cross-list more. This outcome again lends support to 
the liquidity hypothesis that foreign firms facing capital constraints in their home markets 
have the incentive to come to the U.S. to meet their needs for external capital. On the 
other hand, firms coming from a larger home market are less likely to cross-list, as the 
coefficient on LogGNP is negative (-0.178) and significant (p < 0.01).  
At the firm level, the coefficient on Size is positive (1.881) and highly significant 
(p = 0.00), indicating that larger firms are more likely to cross-list which is consistent 
with the notion that larger companies can better bear the compliance costs than smaller 
ones. After controlling all other variables, Growth is not a significant variable as 
univariate analyses show.  Leverage has a small and negative coefficient (-0.001) that is 
significant at p < 0.01, suggesting that the more leveraged firms are less likely to cross-
list. 
                                                 
33 Since there is high correlation between anti-director rights and judicial efficiency (see Table 7 for 
correlation matrix), I do not include both variables in the same regression. I run separate regressions with 
one variable at a time. The coefficient on judicial efficiency is generally positive and significant. 
 42
In sum, the two test variables, Reconcile and Disclosure, have the predicted 
negative signs and are statistically significant at the conventional levels. Thus, the 
multivariate analyses support H1. 
 
6.2.2 Cross-Listing Choices 
 Table 9 shows the results from estimating equation (2), which assesses the 
probability of cross-listing on a major U.S. stock exchange by ADR firms.  Similar to the 
analyses on cross-listing decisions (section 6.2.1), three models are specified, each of 
which uses 533 cross-listed firms as the sample.  
The logit regression is adopted with EX_CL being the dependent variable. As 
Table 9 presents, the explanatory power (pseudo R2) of the model ranges from 17.7% to 
28.4%, depending on the specifications. The coefficient on Reconcile is negative as 
predicted but not significant across all three models, suggesting that reconciliation is not 
necessarily a relevant factor when non-U.S. firms determine whether to list on an 
organized stock exchange. In other words, high reconciliation costs do not appear to 
hinder firms from exchange-listing.  
In terms of Disclosure, the coefficient has the predicted negative sign but is 
significant only for the first two model specifications. When additional control variables 
are introduced into model 3, Disclosure loses its significance. The results suggest that 
disclosure costs have limited influence. When all benefits and costs are considered, firms 
bearing higher disclosure costs (firms that disclose less information under their home 
country accounting standard) are as likely to exchange-list as firms incurring lower 
disclosure costs. While it appears that the effects of Reconcile and Disclosure on firms’ 
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listing choices are not exactly the same, both are insignificant overall in the full model 
and do not support H2.   
 The impact of home country disclosure environment stays strong, with CIFAR’s 
coefficient being positive (0.118) and significant for all three models. This result is 
consistent with the main finding of Hope et al. (2005) that firms originating from a higher 
disclosure regime are more likely to exchange-list. The emerging market economy 
continues to be an important factor in listing choices. EmergM has a coefficient that is 
positive (1.268) and highly significant (p = 0.00), indicating that firms domiciled in an 
emerging market are more likely to list on an organized exchange, which is consistent 
with the liquidity hypothesis. At the firm level, the coefficient on Size equals 1.203 and is 
highly significant (p = 0.00), suggesting that bigger firms tend to exchange-list more 
because they can probably bear the high compliance costs better than smaller firms. 
 In sum, the multivariate analyses from the above two sections find support for H1 
but not for H2. Thus, complying with U.S. GAAP appears to be a cost hurdle for non-U.S. 
firms when considering whether they should come to the U.S. market, which is in line 
with the findings from previous studies.  On the other hand, the lack of support for H2 
reveals that the importance of compliance costs diminishes for cross-listed firms when 
determining where to list their shares.  It appears that factors other than compliance costs 
are more important in the decision process. One possible explanation is that the benefits 
of exchange-listing, such as decrease in the cost of capital, relaxation of capital 
constraints, improvement in visibility, and higher firm values, outweigh the compliance 




 Table 10 presents the results of estimating equation (3a) and (3b) which examine 
whether the valuation impact of cross-listing and exchange-listing varies systematically 
with firms’ compliance costs. I adopt the OLS model and run separate tests for cross-
listing and exchange-listing cases. Two models are specified for each scenario, with 
Tobin’s q being the dependent variable, and 6,654 firms as the sample size.  Model 1 
includes CL (EX_CL), Reconcile, Disclosure, two interaction terms, Anti_D and Liquidity 
as two country-level variables, and Growth and ROA as two firm-level variables. Model 2 
adds one additional country variable, CIFAR, as Hope et al. (2005) find that exchange-
listed firms domiciled in a higher disclosure regime generally receive a higher valuation.  
For both models, the coefficient on CL (EX_CL) is significantly positive, 
suggesting that cross-listed (exchange-listed) firms receive higher valuations than non 
cross-listed (non exchange-listed) firms, which confirms the existence of cross-listing and 
exchange-listing premiums identified in prior literature.  As expected, both the 
reconciliation costs and disclosure costs have a negative impact on firms’ valuations, but 
only the coefficient on Reconcile is statistically significant (p = 0.00).   
In the case of cross-listing, the coefficients on two interaction terms, 
CL*Reconcile and CL*Disclosure, are both negative.  However, only the coefficient on 
CL*Disclosure (-1.059) is statistically different from zero (p = 0.041), suggesting that the 
positive association between a firm’s valuation and its cross-listing status is discounted 
by its disclosure costs.  Specifically, the effect can be computed as -1.059 * Disclosure. 
Using the mean value of Disclosure (0.36) in the calculation would generate an average 
deduction of 0.381 in firms’ valuations due to the disclosure costs.  In other words, on 
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average, the positive effect of cross-listing on valuations (0.579) is reduced by 0.381 as a 
result of disclosure costs. The net result is 0.198 (0.579 minus 0.381).34  
In the case of exchange-listing, the coefficients on two interaction terms, 
EX_CL*Reconcile and EX_CL*Disclosure, are both negative as predicted but not 
statistically significant in the full model (Model 2). In Model 1, the coefficient of 
EX_CL*Disclosure is marginally significant (p = 0.098), suggesting that, to a limited 
extent, the disclosure costs negatively affect the valuations of exchange-listed firms. But 
once CIFAR is introduced in the model, the effect of disclosure costs disappears.  
The impact of CIFAR on firms’ valuations is positive and significant for both 
cross-listing and exchange-listing models, even though its coefficient is small (0.008).  
This outcome is consistent with the findings of Hope et al. (2005) that exchange-listed 
firms coming from countries with a stronger disclosure environment are valued higher 
than those from a weaker disclosure environment.    
In sum, the evidence that disclosure costs reduce the valuations of cross-listed 
firms indicates that investors value the disclosure practices of non-U.S. firms. A cross-
listed firm that is willing to disclose more information on its accounting method choices 
(i.e., has lower disclosure costs) is generally rewarded by the market. On the other hand, 
the reconciliation costs and disclosure costs seem to be irrelevant in valuing exchange-
listed firms. It is possible that since exchange-listed firms (Level II and III ADRs) are 
required to file with the SEC through Form F-6 or Form F-1 and provide financial 
information via Form 20-F reconciliation, investors are aware of their accounting 
                                                 
34 In order to test the statistical significance of the effect of CL, Reconcile, Disclosure and the interaction 
terms on Tobin’s q, I perform the joint F tests. All the tests show that these terms are jointly significant.   
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practices. Therefore, how differently they report under their local GAAPs from the U.S. 
GAAP (proxy by the compliance costs) is not relevant. The lack of finding may also be 
attributed to potential endogeneity problems in the valuation model, which are discussed 
in detail in section 4.4.  
Since endogeneity remains a concern for the overall valuation models, the OLS 
estimators obtained here are potentially biased and inconsistent. Therefore, these 
coefficients should be interpreted with caution. However, this current analysis presents 
the first evidence regarding the impact of compliance costs on firms’ valuations. The 
search for a solution to the potential endogeneity problems will be conducted in future 
research. 
 A common criticism of cross-listing premium is that these firms self-select into 
the cross-listing activity and that certain firm-specific or country-specific characteristics 
are associated with them, leading to their higher valuations.  However, since current 
analysis includes all potential foreign firms that can choose to cross-list or exchange-list, 
self-selection does not present a problem.  
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7.  SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
7.1 The Endogeneity of Compliance Costs  
 As H1 predicts, I find that non-U.S. firms incurring lower compliance costs are 
more likely to engage in cross-listing activities. However, it is also likely that a firm, in 
anticipation of future ADR listing, will move its accounting practices closer to U.S. 
GAAP and/or increase disclosure gradually. Lang et al. (2003) suggest that firms appear 
to change local accounting choices in preparation for cross-listing.  To mitigate the 
potential endogeneity concerns, I identify sample firms that disclose accounting and 
disclosure practices both in the cross-listing years and three years prior to their cross-
listing and compare their compliance costs for the two periods.  
Among the 533 cross-listed firms in the sample, 208 have accounting and 
disclosure data for both the cross-listing years and three years prior to the cross-listing 
years. Table 11 shows their distributions in seven sub-groups by their respective cross-
listing years. The means and medians of Reconcile and Disclosure for the two years in 
comparison are reported.  It appears that, on average, firms incurred lower compliance 
costs in the cross-listing year than in earlier years. However, except for a group of firms 
cross-listed in 1994 that has significantly lower reconciliation costs in 1994 than in 1991, 
the majority of the mean differences are not statistically significant.  The comparison 
seems to indicate that these sample firms’ local accounting practices remain fairly stable 





7.2 Analyses Using Country-Fixed Effect 
    For the basic findings of H1 and H2, some unobservable country-level variables 
may drive the results. To capture the effect of potentially important country variables, I 
estimate equation (1) and (2) by introducing country dummy variables in the regression 
and excluding all other country-level variables. Table 12 presents the logit regression 
results of country-fixed effect for both equations.35  In the case of cross-listing, the 
coefficients on Reconcile and Disclosure are -1.582 and -2.102, respectively, both 
significant at p < 0.01, supporting the baseline results of H1.  In the case of exchange-
listing, the coefficient on Reconcile becomes positive (1.000) but is not significantly 
different from zero.  The coefficient on Disclosure is negative (-4.506) and significant (p-
value equals 0.026), supporting H2’s proposal that cross-listed firms incurring more 
disclosure costs are less likely to list on an organized stock exchange.  This finding is 
consistent with some baseline results of H2 (Model 1 and 2), but not with those of the full 
model where the significance of Disclosure disappears. However, to some extent, this 
outcome indicates that disclosure matters as opposed to reconciliation, which does not.  
 
7.3 Logit Regressions Using Alternative Variable Definitions 
One of the limitations of the current study is measuring the compliance costs by 
using a simple count of the accounting method choices, which essentially assigns equal 
weight to every item.  In reality, different accounting choices should have different 
implications to companies and some should be weighed more heavily than the others. To 
                                                 
35 I lose 62 observations for the exchange-listing analysis because a few countries do not have exchange-
listed ADRs in the sample. For the cross-listing analysis, I lose 36 observations as one country does not 
have ADR firms in the original sample.    
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potentially mitigate this issue, I categorize two test variables (reconcile and disclosure) 
each into three levels: high, medium and low, based on their respective sample 
distributions. Specifically, the high group represents firms in the 75 percentile 
distribution, the low group represents firms in the 25 percentile, and the medium group 
lies in between 25 and 75 percentiles. Using the medium group as the base, I include the 
high and low groups in the regression. This treatment recognizes that firms in the high 
group should have compliance costs that are quite different from those in the low group, 
which allows better comprehension of the role of compliance costs in firms’ cross-listing 
and exchange-listing decisions.  
Table 13 presents the logit regression results for equation (1) and (2) using the 
following alternative test variables: L_Rec, H_Rec, L_Dis, and H_Dis.  In terms of cross-
listing decisions, the coefficients on L_Rec and L_Dis are both positive and statistically 
significant (0.213 and 0.709).  In contrast, the coefficients on H_Rec and H_Dis are both 
negative (-0.020 and -0.570) and H_Dis is statistically significant (p = 0.00).  The overall 
findings confirm the baseline results that foreign firms bearing lower compliance costs 
are more likely to cross-list while firms having higher compliance costs are less likely to 
cross-list (H1).   
With regard to listing choices, the coefficients on L_Rec and L_Dis are both 
positive but not statistically significant, and the coefficients on H_Rec and H_Dis are 
both negative but not statistically significant.  Consequently, the prediction of H2 that 
compliance costs would hinder a firm from exchange-listing does not hold. The evidence 
confirms the basic findings which suggest that compliance costs do not seem important  
when cross-listed firms choose where to list their shares.  
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Overall, it appears that the baseline results are robust to the alternative definitions 
of two test variables. 
 
7.4 Valuations Using Alternative Variable Definitions 
 Another way to examine the valuation impact of cross-listing and exchange-
listing is to divide the sample firms into low, medium and high cost groups as defined in 
section 7.3. 
Table 14 presents the results of separate OLS regressions for cross-listing and 
exchange-listing cases. Similar to the valuation analyses contained in section 6.2.3, I 
specify two models for each scenario. Model 1 includes CL (EX_CL) which is to capture 
the cross-listing (exchange-listing) effects. Using the medium group as the base, I include 
L_Rec, H_Rec, L_Dis and H_Dis, and their respective interactions with CL (EX_CL).  In 
addition, I use Anti_D and Liquidity as two country-level variables and Growth and ROA 
as two firm-level variables.  Model 2 adds one additional country variable, CIFAR, to 
reflect the potential effect of home country disclosure regime on firms’ valuations.  
The cross-listing regression shows that the coefficient on CL is positive but not 
statistically significant.  Some evidence indicates that reconciliation costs affect firms’ 
valuations since the coefficient on L_Rec is positively significant in Model 2 and the 
coefficient of H_Rec negatively significant in Model 1. Two interaction terms, CL*L_Rec 
and CL*H_Dis, are significant.  Specifically, the coefficient on CL*L_Rec is positive 
(0.251), suggesting that cross-listed firms incurring low reconciliation costs receive a 
higher valuation (on average 0.251) than cross-listed firms in the medium cost group. The 
coefficient on CL*H_Dis is negative (-0.368), suggesting that cross-listed firms incurring 
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high disclosure costs receive a lower valuation (on average 0.368) than cross-listed firms 
in the medium cost group. This outcome is consistent with the baseline results.  
The regression on exchange-listing shows that the coefficient on EX_CL is 
positively significant, confirming the existence of exchange-listing premiums. Same as 
the cross-listing regression, two interaction terms, EX_CL*L_Rec and EX_CL*H_Dis, are 
significant.  Specifically, the coefficient on EX_CL*L_Rec is positive (0.656), suggesting 
that exchange-listed firms incurring low reconciliation costs receive a higher valuation 
(on average 0.656) than exchange-listed firms in the medium cost group. The coefficient 
of EX_CL*H_Dis is negative (-1.034), suggesting that exchange-listed firms incurring 
high disclosure costs receive a lower valuation (on average 1.034) than exchange-listed 
firms in the medium cost group. This outcome is largely in agreement with the baseline 
results.36
 In summary, the results in this section are, in general, in line with the basic 
findings contained in section 6.1 and 6.2.  H1 continues to find empirical support in 
country-fixed effect analyses as well as regressions using alternative variable definitions, 
suggesting that U.S. GAAP compliance costs play an important role in foreign firms’ 
cross-listing decisions. This result is also consistent with the findings from prior survey 
or case studies.  
In agreement with the baseline results, the sensitivity analyses do not support H2, 
implying as they do that U.S. GAAP compliance costs are not too relevant in firms’ 
                                                 
36 In order to test the statistical significance of the effect of CL (EX_CL), L_Rec, H_Rec, L_Dis, H_Dis, and 
the interaction terms on Tobin’s q, I perform the joint F tests. All the tests show that these terms are jointly 
significant.   
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choice of listing. However, there is evidence indicating that disclosure matters to some 
extent.   
In summary, the valuation impact of cross-listing lies only with the disclosure 
costs at the baseline. The sensitivity analyses using high, medium and low cost groups 
show that lower reconciliation costs increase the values of cross-listed firms and higher 
disclosure costs decrease the values of cross-listed firms.  Furthermore, at the baseline, 
the values of exchange-listed firms are affected, to a limited extent, by the disclosure 
costs. The sensitivity tests find support for the effect of reconciliation costs and 
disclosure costs. Therefore, the overall evidence indicates that cross-listed (exchange-
listed) firms that disclose more information, thereby incurring lower disclosure costs, are 
rewarded by the market with higher values.  
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8.  CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 This paper studies whether complying with U.S. GAAP impacts non-U.S. firms’ 
cross-listing decisions and listing choices. The capital market consequence of compliance 
is also evaluated. This investigation is important, given the rapid growth of cross-listing 
in the U.S. and the increasing capital market integration around the globe. By directly 
examining a major cross-listing cost at the firm level, this study provides a new 
perspective on foreign firms’ cost and benefit analysis.  It also complements extant 
research by offering a more comprehensive measure of U.S. GAAP compliance.  
 Consistent with the findings from earlier survey and case studies, I find that 
complying with U.S. financial reporting requirements is a significant cost factor when 
non-U.S. firms consider whether they should issue or list their shares in the U.S. market. 
However, the importance of compliance costs diminishes when foreign firms come to 
determine whether they should cross-list on an organized stock exchange where U.S. 
GAAP compliance is required. This lack of finding is likely attributable to the fact that a 
U.S. listing, especially an exchange-listing, gives foreign firms various benefits, such as 
higher valuations, reduction in the cost of capital, relaxation of capital constraints, 
increase in firms’ visibility and subsequent equity issues, which potentially outweigh the 
compliance costs. The valuation analyses confirm the existence of cross-listing and 
exchange-listing premiums. In addition, I find that disclosure costs negatively affect the 
values of cross-listed firms; i.e., cross-listed firms that disclose less accounting 
information (incurring higher disclosure costs) are valued less by the market.  To some 
extent, exchange-listed firms that disclose less accounting information are also valued 
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less by the market. This finding is consistent with the general theme in the literatures that 
disclosure matters.    
  The current study contributes to the understanding of the role accounting plays in 
non-U.S firms’ decision-making processes.  These findings could be viewed in two very 
different ways.  On one hand, from the standpoint of the U.S. accounting regulator (the 
SEC) and standard-setters, the evidence presented in this paper indicates that U.S. 
accounting and disclosure requirements do hinder potential non-U.S. firms from listing or 
issuing shares in the U.S. markets, which would help to protect U.S. investors from 
misleading financial information. On the other hand, U.S. exchange officials may not find 
the results desirable as the competition among stock exchanges around the world has 
become very fierce. Exchanges in other countries are trying to attract more foreign 
listings and normally do not require GAAP compliance. In addition, U.S. investors may 
lose opportunities to invest in potentially good foreign companies which are turned away 
by the requirement of complying with U.S. GAAP. 
 The study is subject to several limitations. First, the models may omit some 
potentially relevant variables. For example, theory has proposed that when private control 
benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to choose to list their shares in 
the U.S.  With no access to firms’ ownership data, I am unable to control for 
shareholders’ effects on cross-listing decisions. However, by including the investor 
protection variables, I may mitigate the problem to some extent.  Second, the use of 
Tobin’s q cannot fully capture the benefits of cross-listing, as firms also enjoy other 
advantages such as the ability to issue more equity subsequently, and increased visibility 
in the product markets, etc.  Third, the examination of 13 accounting choices may not 
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necessarily capture the full reconciliation cost, and the self-constructed disclosure index 
does not cover the complete list of disclosure items. Last, the endogeneity issue remains a 
concern for the valuation models.  
 Future research can study the impact of SOX on foreign firms’ cross-listing 
activities. It is possible that more firms will prefer to list as Rule 144a or Level I ADRs, 
to avoid the large SOX compliance costs.  It would be interesting to examine the 
accounting and disclosure practices of these non exchange-listed firms. The evidence 
produced would be relevant for assessing information that companies disclose in the 
absence of reporting requirements under the Exchange Act (Frost and Lang 1996).  
Future research can also examine firms’ decisions to delist from the U.S. exchanges, 
claiming high compliance costs as the primary reason for withdrawal.  In particular, 
future research can identify firm and country characteristics associated with delisting due 
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Classification of Accounting Practices as Consistent or Inconsistent with U.S. GAAP 
(Source: Bradshaw and Miller 2005; Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller 2004) 
 U S GAAP  
 Compliant Not compliant 
1.  Accounting for 
goodwill 
Amortized 
Amortized and/or taken to reserves 
Not amortized, expensed when incurred 
Written off at management discretion 
Taken to reserves 
   
2.  Accounting for other 
intangibles/deferred 
charges 
Amortized Capitalized, not amortized 
Expensed when incurred 
Capitalized, written off at management 
discretion 
Taken to reserves 
   
3.  Accounting for long 
term financial leases 
Capitalized and amortized Expensed 
Some capitalized and some expensed 
   
4.  Accounting method 




Lower of cost and intrinsic value 
Equity 
Market value 
   
5.  Accounting method 
for long term 
investments 21-50% 
Equity 
Equity but consolidated where   
significant influence 
Equity and cost depending on 
significant influence 
Cost 
Cost but consolidated where significant 
influence 
Equity and proportional consolidation 
   
6.  Accounting method 
for long term 
investments greater 
than 50% 
All subsidiaries are consolidated 
Consolidation for significant 
subsidiaries - others are on an 
equity basis 
Consolidation for significant 
subsidiaries, others are on a cost 
basis 
Domestic subsidiaries consolidated - others 
on a cost basis 
Domestic subsidiaries consolidated - others 
on a equity basis 
Foreign subsidiaries consolidated - others on 
a cost basis 
Foreign subsidiaries consolidated - others on 
a equity basis 
No consolidation - cost basis (parent 
company only) 
No consolidation - equity basis (parent 
company only) 
   
7.  Deferred taxes 
recorded 
Yes No - taxes paid as incurred 
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8.  Financial statements 
cost basis 
Historical cost entirely 
Historical cost with price-level 
adjustment or revaluation of 
specific accounts 
Historical cost with supplementary current 
cost financial information 
Current cost statements entirely 
Modified historical cost with supplemental 
current cost financial information 
Current cost with supplemental historical 
cost financial information 
   
9.  Funds definition on 
statement of changes 
in financial position 
Cash 
Modified cash 
Prior to 1989, other definitions 
acceptable under APB 19 
Working capital 
Modified working capital 
Unique definition 
Net borrowings 
Net liquid assets 
   
10. Marketable 
securities valuation 
Lower of cost or market 
Historical cost 
Subsequent to 1993, current market 
value and cost with periodic 
valuation acceptable under 
SFAS115 




Cost with periodic revaluation 
   
11. Research and 
development costs 
Expensed currently 
For computer companies in SIC 
codes 5054, 7371, or 7372, 
Capitalized and amortized later or 
Some expensed some capitalized 
are considered consistent with US 
GAAP 
Capitalized and amortized later 
Expensed and capitalized later 
Some expensed - some capitalized 
   
12. Starting line of 
statement of 
changes in financial 
position 
Net income, bottom line 
Prior to 1989, Net income before 
minority interest, Net income 
before extraordinary items, and 
other definitions were acceptable 
under APB 19. 
Net income before net allocations to reserves




Sales plus other operating income 
Operating income 
Net income before interest 
Cash receipts 
Operating income before depreciation 
   
13. Treasury stock 
location on balance 
sheet 





List of Disclosure Items 
 
Company Specific Accounting Policies 
Accounting for foreign currency transaction gain/loss  
Accounting for goodwill    
Accounting for long term financial leases 
Accounting for other intangibles/deferred charges 
Accounting method for long term investment <20% 
Accounting method for long term investment 21-50% 
Accounting method for long term investment >50% 
Accounting standards followed 
Acquisition method 
Contingent liabilities disclosed 
Currency of financial report 
Deferred taxes recorded 
Depreciation method 
Discretionary reserves 
Earnings per share numerator used for computed ratio 
Financial statements cost basis 
Foreign currency translation method 
Funds definition on statement of changes in financial position 
Inventory costing method 
Marketable securities classification 
Minority interest effect 
Pension fund contribution 
Research & development costs 
Reason for extraordinary items 
Reason for changes in financial statement 
Treasury stock gain/loss 
Treasury stock location on balance sheet 
Starting line- changes in financial position 
Pension fund management 
 














List of CIFAR Annual Report Variables (Hope 2003) 
A: General information    E: Accounting policies 
Address/Telephone/Fax/Telex   Accounting Standards 
Product Segment     Financial Statements Cost Basis 
Geographic Segment    50% Long-Term Investments 
Management Information    Starting Point for Funds Statement 
Subsidiaries Information    Research & Development Costs 
Future Plans/Chairman or CEO’s Statement  Pension Costs 
Number of Employees    Reasons for Extraordinary Items 
Fiscal Year-End     Inventory Costing Method 
20% Long-Term Investments 
B: Income statement    21-50% Long-Term Investments 
Consolidated Income Statement   Acquisition Method 
Cost of Goods Sold    Accounting for Goodwill 
Complete Income Statement   Deferred Taxes 
Sales      Outside Manager of Pension Funds 
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses Long-Term Financial Leases 
Operating Income    Foreign Currency Translation Method 
Foreign Exchange Gains/Losses   Foreign Currency Translation Gains/Losses 
Extraordinary Gains/Losses    Discretionary Reserves 
Income Tax Expense    Minority Interest 
Minority Interest     Contingent Liabilities 
Net Income Reported  
F: Stockholders’ information 
C: Balance sheet     Dividends per Share 
Complete Balance Sheet    Earnings per Share 
Current Assets Separated from Fixed Assets  Number of Shares Outstanding 
Current Liability Separated from LT Liability Multiple Shares 
Owners’ Equity Separated from Liability  Par Value 
Separation of Non-Equity Reserves and   Total Dividends 
Retained Earnings   Stock Split/Dividend/Rights Issues 
Cash and Cash Equivalents   Stock Price  
Accounts Receivable    Stock Exchange Listing 
Inventories     Volume Traded 
Current Assets     Diluted Earnings per Share 
Fixed Assets on Asset Side   Quarterly/Interim Dividends 
Goodwill and Other Intangibles   Changes in Capital 
Total Assets Can Be Derived   Different Dividends for Multiple Classes of Shares 
Shareholders’ Equity Changes   EPS for Multiple Classes of Shares 
Appropriation of Retained Earnings  Significant Shareholders 
      Composition of Shareholdings 
D: Funds flow/cash flow 
Funds Flow Statement    G: Supplementary information 
Complete Funds Flow Statement   Earnings per Share Numerator 
Funds from Operations    Earnings per Share Denominator 
Funds Definition     Notes to Accounts 
Cash Flow Statement    Disclosure of Subsequent Events 
      Remuneration of Directors and Officers 
      Research & Development Costs 
      Capital Expenditure 
      List of Board Members and Their Affiliations 





Variable Definition        
CL = 1 if the firm is a cross-listed firm, and 0 otherwise 
EX_CL = 1 if the firm is an exchange-listed firm, and 0 otherwise 
Reconcile = A firm’s reconciliation costs measured by its compliance with U.S. GAAP on 
13 accounting method choices, computed as the sum of noncompliant items 
divided by 13. 
Disclosure = A firm’s disclosure costs measured by the availability of 31 accounting 
method choices, computed as the sum of non-disclosed items divided by 31. 
CIFER = A country-level disclosure index which rates companies’ annual reports for 
their inclusion or exclusion of 85 items  
InvestProtec = Shareholder protection in the home country. Three measures are used: 
country legal origin, anti-director rights, and judicial efficiency (LLSV 1998) 
E_Law = 1 if the firm is from an English common law system country, and 0 otherwise 
F_Law = 1 if the firm is from a French code law system country, and 0 otherwise 
G_Law = 1 if the firm is from a German code law system country, and 0 otherwise 
S_Law = 1 if the firm is from a Scandinavian code law system country, and 0 
otherwise 
Anti_D = Index that aggregates six different shareholder rights, ranging from 1 to 6 
(highest) 
Jud_E = Index of efficiency and integrity of legal environment, ranging from 1 to 10 
(highest) 
EmergM = 1 if the International Finance Corporation classifies a firm’s home market as 
emerging, and 0 otherwise 
Liquidity = The dollar value of shares traded divided by the average market capitalization 
in 1997 (IFC Emerging Markets Factbook 1998) 
LogGNP = Log of GNP (1997) in billions of U.S. dollars in the country  
Size = Log of total assets in millions of dollars as of 1999  
Growth = net sales growth as of 1999 (in percentage) 
Leverage = Long-term debt divided by common equity as of 1999 (in percentage) 
ROA = Net income divided by total assets as of 1999 (in percentage)   
Tobin’s q = (total assets – book value of equity + market value of equity) / total assets as 
of 1999 
Industry = Industry membership, 1-digit SIC code 
L_Rec = 1 if Reconcile is below the 25 percentile distribution, and 0 otherwise  
H_Rec = 1 if Reconcile is above the 75 percentile distribution, and 0 otherwise  
L_Dis = 1 if Disclosure is below the 25 percentile distribution, and 0 otherwise  








TABLE 1: SAMPLE SELECTION 
      
Description   
Number 
of Firms 
Non-U.S. firms with 1999 fiscal year end a    14,376 
firms in countries where country-level variables are not available  (947)
firms that have total assets less than US$100 million  (5,025)
firms that did not disclose information on accounting policy  (865)
firms that have missing firm-level control variables  (813)
firms that voluntarily adopted U.S. GAAP  (72)
       Total sample firms  6,654 
   
Listing status of sample firms as of December 31, 1999   
Traded under Rule 144a 111   
Traded over the counter (Level I) 289   
Listed on an organized stock exchange (Level II) 74   
Listed on an organized stock exchange (Level III) 59   
       Total cross-listed firms  533 
       Total non cross-listed firms  6,121 
       Total sample firms   6,654 
 
a Samples are taken from the Worldscope CDs of June 2000 and June 2001 
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TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTIONS BY COUNTRY AND LISTING TYPES 
                
  Non      
  Cross-listed Cross-listed Rule    
Country Total Firms Firms 144a Level I Level II Level III 
Argentina 36 25 11 4 0 3 4
Australia 201 179 22 3 12 5 2
Austria 56 48 8 0 8 0 0
Belgium 72 70 2 0 2 0 0
Brazil 87 75 12 1 5 5 1
Chile 66 58 8 0 0 0 8
Denmark 105 102 3 0 2 0 1
Finland 62 57 5 1 1 2 1
France 312 294 18 1 9 2 6
Germany 318 308 10 0 8 1 1
Greece 65 61 4 1 1 0 2
Hong Kong 261 213 48 0 47 0 1
India 159 117 42 40 1 1 0
Ireland 35 28 7 0 3 3 1
Israel 25 19 6 1 0 3 2
Italy 157 145 12 2 7 2 1
Japan 2,173 2,081 92 1 87 3 1
Korea 124 112 12 8 0 2 2
Malaysia 244 233 11 11 0 0 0
Mexico 71 41 30 3 15 2 10
Netherlands 122 107 15 0 5 6 4
New Zealand 36 36 0 0 0 0 0
Norway 75 72 3 0 3 0 0
Pakistan 20 18 2 1 1 0 0
Philippines 65 59 6 2 3 1 0
Portugal 34 29 5 2 1 0 2
Singapore 130 121 9 0 9 0 0
South Africa 113 95 18 0 13 5 0
Spain 109 103 6 1 3 0 2
Sweden 104 95 9 1 6 2 0
Switzerland 141 137 4 0 4 0 0
Taiwan 165 143 22 20 0 1 1
Thailand 110 100 10 1 9 0 0
Turkey 25 20 5 4 1 0 0
UK 776 720 56 2 23 25 6
Total 6654 6121 533 111 289 74 59
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TABLE 3: DESCRIPTION OF COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES 
          
  CIFAR Anti_D Jud_E E_Law F_Law G_Law S_Law Liquidity GNP 
Argentina 68 4 6.00 0 1 0 0 0.50 319.3 
Australia 80 4 10.00 1 0 0 0 0.52 382.7 
Austria 62 2 9.50 0 0 1 0 0.71 225.4 
Belgium 68 0 9.50 0 1 0 0 0.23 272.4 
Brazil 56 3 5.75 0 1 0 0 0.86 784.0 
Chile 78 5 7.25 0 1 0 0 0.11 70.5 
Denmark 75 2 10.00 0 0 0 1 0.57 184.4 
Finland 83 3 10.00 0 0 0 1 0.53 127.4 
France 78 3 8.00 0 1 0 0 0.64 1541.6 
Germany 67 1 9.00 0 0 1 0 1.38 2321.0 
Greece 61 2 7.00 0 1 0 0 0.73 122.4 
Hong Kong 73 5 10.00 1 0 0 0 1.13 163.8 
India 61 5 8.00 1 0 0 0 0.43 357.4 
Ireland 81 4 8.75 1 0 0 0 0.83 65.1 
Israel 74 3 10.00 1 0 0 0 0.26 94.4 
Italy 66 1 6.75 0 1 0 0 0.66 95.4 
Japan 71 4 10.00 0 0 1 0 0.46 4812.1 
Korea 68 2 6.00 0 0 1 0 1.88 485.2 
Malaysia 79 4 9.00 1 0 0 0 0.73 98.2 
Mexico 71 1 6.00 0 1 0 0 0.38 348.6 
Netherlands 74 2 10.00 0 1 0 0 0.67 403.1 
New Zealand 80 4 10.00 1 0 0 0 0.38 59.5 
Norway 75 4 10.00 0 0 0 1 0.75 159.0 
Pakistan 73 5 5.00 1 0 0 0 1.06 64.6 
Philippines 64 3 4.75 0 1 0 0 0.35 88.4 
Portugal 56 3 5.50 0 1 0 0 0.66 109.5 
Singapore 79 4 10.00 1 0 0 0 0.50 101.8 
South Africa 79 5 6.00 1 0 0 0 0.19 130.2 
Spain 72 4 6.25 0 1 0 0 1.70 569.6 
Sweden 83 3 10.00 0 0 0 1 0.68 231.9 
Switzerland 80 2 10.00 0 0 1 0 1.01 305.2 
Taiwan 58 3 6.75 0 0 1 0 4.62 292.6 
Thailand 66 2 3.25 1 0 0 0 0.38 165.8 
Turkey 58 2 4.00 0 1 0 0 1.30 199.3 
UK 85 5 10.00 1 0 0 0 0.44 1231.3 
 
See Appendix D for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
(N=6,654) 
          
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
CL 0.08    0.27 0.00 1.00
EX_CL 0.02    0.15 0.00 1.00
Reconcile 0.23    0.16 0.00 1.00
Disclosure 0.36    0.12 0.06 0.84
CIFAR 73.13    7.13 56.00 85.00
Anti_D 3.57    1.23 0.00 5.00
Jud_E 9.00    1.64 3.25 10.00
E_Law 0.32    0.47 0.00 1.00
F_Law 0.18    0.39 0.00 1.00
G_Law 0.45    0.50 0.00 1.00
S_Law 0.05    0.22 0.00 1.00
EmergM 0.20    0.40 0.00 1.00
Liquidity 0.73    0.71 0.11 4.62
LogGNP 6.77    1.49 4.09 8.48
Size 5.89    0.68 5.00 8.92
Growth 8.56  51.57 -100.00 1146.49
Leverage 76.89     278.40 -2834.68 5227.73
ROA 4.14   8.71 -69.45 116.00
Tobin's Q 1.40   1.35 0.22 25.18
 
See Appendix D for variable definitions.
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TABLE 5: COMPARISON BETWEEN CROSS-LISTED and  
NON CROSS-LISTED FIRMS 





firms Cross-listed firms Differences in 
 (N = 6,654) (N = 6,121) (N = 533) (NCL - CL) 
Variables         
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
         
Reconcile 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.20   0.03***    0.02+++
Disclosure 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.31 0.29   0.06***    0.06+++
CIFAR 73.13 71.00 73.23 71.00 71.99 71.00   1.24***    0.00++
Anti_D 3.57 4.00 3.56 4.00 3.63 4.00  -0.07    0.00++
Jud_E 9.00 10.00 9.04 10.00 8.46 9.75   0.58***    0.25+++
E_Law 0.32 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.43 0.00  -0.12***    0.00+++
F_Law 0.18 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.25 0.00  -0.07***    0.00+++
G_Law 0.45 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.28 0.00   0.18***    0.00+++
S_Law 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00   0.02*    0.00 
EmergM 0.20 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.37 0.00  -0.18***    0.00+++
Liquidity 0.73 0.46 0.72 0.46 0.79 0.46  -0.07*    0.00 
LogGNP 6.77 7.12 6.81 7.12 6.23 5.88   0.59***    1.24+++
Size 5.89 5.73 5.84 5.68 6.52 6.46  -0.68***   -0.78+++
Growth 8.56 1.01 8.10 0.63 13.81 5.55  -5.71**   -4.92+++
Leverage 76.89 29.57 76.87 28.37 77.16 41.26  -0.30 -12.89+++
ROA 4.14 2.97 3.95 2.84 6.28 5.17  -2.33***   -2.33+++
 
See Appendix D for variable definitions.  Tests for differences in means are based on paired t-tests. Tests 
for differences in medians are based on Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. 
 
***, **, * The difference in means is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1level, respectively (two-tailed).  
+++, ++, + The difference in medians is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1level, respectively (two-tailed).  
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TABLE 6: COMPARISON BETWEEN EXCHANGE-LISTED and  
NON EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS 







firms Differences in 
 (N = 533) (N = 400) (N = 133) (NEXL - EXL) 
Variables         
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median 
Reconcile 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.20   0.02   0.00 
Disclosure 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.29   0.04***   0.03+++
CIFAR 71.99 71.00 70.92 71.00 75.23 78.00  -4.31*** -7.00+++
Anti_D 3.63 4.00 3.68 4.00 3.49 4.00   0.19   0.00 
Jud_E 8.46 9.75 8.53 10.00 8.28 8.75   0.25   1.25 
E_Law 0.43 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.41 0.00   0.03   0.00 
F_Law 0.25 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.46 0.00  -0.28***   0.00+++
G_Law 0.28 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.09 0.00   0.25***   0.00+++
S_Law 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00  -0.01   0.00 
EmergM 0.37 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.38 0.00  -0.02   0.00 
Liquidity 0.79 0.46 0.85 0.46 0.63 0.46   0.22***   0.00+++
LogGNP 6.23 5.88 6.28 5.88 6.06 6.00   0.22*  -0.12 
Size 6.52 6.46 6.41 6.37 6.83 6.83  -0.42***  -0.46+++
Growth 13.81 5.55 13.60 3.90 14.47 9.55  -0.87  -5.65+++
Leverage 77.16 41.26 78.13 38.68 74.25 45.04   3.88  -6.36 
ROA 6.28 5.17 5.78 4.62 7.78 7.19  -2.00**  -2.58+++
 
See Appendix D for variable definitions.  Tests for differences in means are based on paired t-tests. Tests 
for differences in medians are based on Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. 
 
***, **, * The difference in means is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1level, respectively (two-tailed).  
+++, ++, + The difference in medians is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1level, respectively (two-tailed).  
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TABLE 7: CORRELATION MATRIX 
                
Panel A: Correlation Matrix      
  Reconcile Disclosure CIFAR Anti_D Jud_E EmergM Liquidity 
Reconcile  1       
Disclosure  0.21***  1      
CIFAR  0.15*** -0.10***  1     
Anti_D  0.20*** -0.03**  0.43***  1    
Jud_E  0.15*** -0.11***  0.46***  0.36***  1   
EmergM -0.03**  0.05*** -0.33*** -0.05*** -0.70***  1  
Liquidity -0.15*** -0.03*** -0.40*** -0.25*** -0.30***  0.30***  1 
LogGNP  0.02 -0.00 -0.06***  0.18***  0.46*** -0.48*** -0.18*** 
Size -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.04*** -0.11*** -0.01 -0.06***  0.01 
Growth -0.01  0.05***  0.02* -0.06*** -0.11***  0.06***  0.05*** 
Leverage -0.01  0.04*** -0.05*** -0.07***  0.00 -0.02* -0.01 
ROA  0.02  0.03***  0.06*** -0.06*** -0.11***  0.09***  0.05*** 
Tobin's Q -0.05*** -0.02  0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.01  0.04*** 
        
  Liquidity LogGNP Size Growth Leverage ROA Tobin's Q 
Liquidity  1       
LogGNP -0.18***  1      
Size  0.01  0.04***  1     
Growth  0.05*** -0.13*** -0.01  1    
Leverage -0.01  0.03***  0.21*** -0.01  1   
ROA  0.05*** -0.21*** -0.05***  0.33*** -0.05*** 1  
Tobin's Q  0.04*** -0.10*** -0.04***  0.14*** -0.05*** 0.35*** 1 
        
           
Panel B: Variance Inflation Factor      
Variable VIF 1/VIF      
G-Law 5.86 0.171      
LogGNP 4.21 0.238      
F_Law 2.51 0.398      
CIFAR 2.34 0.428      
Anti_D 2.08 0.482      
EmergM 1.80 0.556      
Liquidity 1.44 0.696      
S_Law 1.30 0.769      
Reconcile 1.14 0.876      
Disclosure 1.11 0.905      
Size 1.10 0.907      
Leverage 1.06 0.945      
Growth 1.04 0.966      
Mean VIF 2.07        
 
See Appendix D for variable definitions.  Panel A presents the Pearson correlation between key variables. 
***, **, * indicate significance level, respectively, at 0.01, 005 and 0.1 level.  
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TABLE 8: LOGIT REGRESSION OF CROSS-LISTING 
(N=6,654) 
                  
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient 
  (p-value) of dy/dx   (p-value) of dy/dx   (p-value) of dy/dx 
Intercept   5.081***   -4.491***   -8.276***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Reconcile -1.314*** -0.075  -0.639* -0.025  -0.686* -0.024 
 (0.000)   (0.104)   (0.081)  
Disclosure -5.131*** -0.294  -4.866*** -0.192  -1.239** -0.043 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.039)  
CIFAR -0.075*** -0.004  -0.066*** -0.003  -0.055*** -0.002 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Anti_D  0.150*** 0.009   0.218*** 0.009   0.238*** 0.008 
 (0.003)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
F_Law -0.341** -0.018  -0.465** -0.016  -0.526*** -0.016 
 (0.027)   (0.011)   (0.004)  
G_Law -1.407*** -0.080  -1.350*** -0.053  -1.157*** -0.040 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
S_Law -0.578** -0.027  -0.318 -0.011  -0.451* -0.013 
 (0.023)   (0.243)   (0.103)  
EmergM     0.804*** 0.040   0.618*** 0.026 
    (0.000)   (0.000)  
Liquidity    -0.009 0.000  -0.042 -0.001 
    (0.904)   (0.564)  
LogGNP    -0.011 0.000  -0.178*** -0.006 
    (0.862)   (0.007)  
Size     1.351*** 0.053   1.881*** 0.066 
    (0.000)   (0.000)  
Growth        0.001 0.000 
       (0.153)  
Leverage       -0.001*** -0.000 
       (0.003)  
Industry       Included Included 
         
Pseudo R2 0.083   0.206   0.236  
Predicted Pr (CL=1) 0.061     0.041     0.036 
 
See Appendix D for variable definitions.  The dependent variable in the models is CL. The models are 
estimated using the Logit regression. 




TABLE 9: LOGIT REGRESSION OF EXCHANGE-LISTING 
(N=533) 
                
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient  Coefficient Coefficient 
  (p-value) of dy/dx   (p-value) of dy/dx   (p-value) of dy/dx 
Intercept -6.935***   -14.785***   -17.897***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Reconcile -1.008 -0.158   -1.150 -0.168  -0.772 -0.106 
 (0.317)   (0.272)   (0.477)  
Disclosure -3.050*** -0.478  -3.540*** -0.518  -1.754 -0.240 
 (0.007)   (0.005)   (0.265)  
CIFAR  0.086*** 0.013   0.099*** 0.014   0.118*** 0.016 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Anti_D  0.056 0.009   0.068 0.010   0.044 0.006 
 (0.635)   (0.593)   (0.738)  
F_Law  1.888*** 0.368   1.692*** 0.311   1.754*** 0.309 
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
G_Law -0.713* -0.101  -1.192* -0.148  -0.970 -0.115 
 (0.100)   (0.053)   (0.129)  
S_Law -0.167 -0.025  -0.076 -0.011  -0.144 -0.019 
 (0.768)   (0.898)   (0.816)  
EmergM     1.320*** 0.216   1.268*** 0.194 
    (0.000)   (0.000)  
Liquidity     0.242 0.035   0.272 0.037 
    (0.275)   (0.254)  
LogGNP     0.118 0.017   0.017 0.002 
    (0.421)   (0.916)  
Size     0.883*** 0.129   1.203*** 0.164 
    (0.000)   (0.000)  
Growth       -0.001 0.000 
       (0.710)  
Leverage       -0.000 0.000 
       (0.766)  
Industry       Included Included 
         
Pseudo R2 0.177   0.239   0.284  
Predicted Pr (EX_CL=1) 0.195     0.178     0.163 
 
See Appendix D for variable definitions.  The dependent variable in the models is EX_CL. The models are 
estimated using the Logit regression. 





TABLE 10: VALUATION IMPACT OF CROSS-LISTING AND EXCHAENG LISTING 
(N=6,654) 
            
Cross-listing  Exchange-listing 
 Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient 
  (p-value) (p-value)     (p-value) (p-value) 
Intercept       1.348***       0.792***  Intercept 1.342*** 0.815*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) 
CL       0.619***       0.579***  EX_CL 1.388***   1.338*** 
 (0.000) (0.001)    (0.000) (0.000) 
Reconcile      -0.359***      -0.382***  Reconcile  -0.377*** -0.396*** 
 (0.001) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) 
Disclosure       -0.068      -0.020  Disclosure  -0.074 -0.027 
 (0.612)      (0.882)    (0.574) (0.837) 
CL * Reconcile      -0.564      -0.494  EX_CL * Reconcile  -1.476 -1.484 
      (0.163)      (0.223)    (0.117) (0.115) 
CL * Disclosure   -1.183**   -1.059**  EX_CL * Disclosure  -1.591* -1.436 
 (0.022)      (0.041)    (0.098) (0.136) 
CIFAR       0.008***  CIFAR   0.008*** 
       (0.002)    (0.003) 
Anti_D   -0.023*    -0.040***  Anti_D  -0.021 -0.037*** 
 (0.078)      (0.005)   (0.106) (0.010) 
Liquidity 0.007       0.032  Liquidity  0.010  0.034 
 (0.758)      (0.183)   (0.649) (0.156) 
Growth     0.001**  0.001*  Growth  0.001**  0.001* 
 (0.041)      (0.056)   (0.047) (0.062) 
ROA       0.053***      0.052***  ROA  0.052***  0.052*** 
 (0.000)      (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.130      0.133  0.134 
 
See Appendix D for variable definitions.  The dependent variable in the models is Tobin’s q. The models 
are estimated using the OLS regression. 
***, **, * indicate significance level, respectively, at 0.01, 005 and 0.1 level.  
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TABLE 11: COMPARISON ON COMPLIANCE COSTS BETWEEN CROSS-LISTING YEAR 
AND THREE YEARS PRIOR TO CROSS-LISTING 
            
  Reconcile Disclosure Reconcile Disclosure 
Year Obs Mean Mean Median Median 
1996 39 0.22 0.35 0.20 0.35 
1999* 39 0.20 0.32 0.20 0.32 
Difference  0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 
p-value  0.54 0.26 0.62 0.27 
      
1995 30 0.27 0.37 0.26 0.32 
1998* 30 0.22 0.33 0.22 0.29 
Difference  0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 
p-value  0.16 0.30 0.09 0.25 
      
1994 31 0.26 0.35 0.25 0.35 
1997* 31 0.23 0.33 0.22 0.32 
Difference  0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
p-value  0.37 0.56 0.32 0.58 
      
1993 23 0.24 0.38 0.25 0.39 
1996* 23 0.23 0.32 0.20 0.29 
Difference  0.01 0.06 0.05 0.10 
p-value  0.78 0.10 0.60 0.10 
      
1992 25 0.32 0.35 0.33 0.35 
1995* 25 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.29 
Difference  0.02 0.03 0.00 0.06 
p-value  0.52 0.34 0.61 0.29 
      
1991 36 0.30 0.40 0.33 0.40 
1994* 36 0.22 0.36 0.21 0.35 
Difference  0.08 0.04 0.12 0.05 
p-value  0.04 0.23 0.03 0.25 
      
1990 24 0.25 0.42 0.27 0.42 
1993* 24 0.23 0.39 0.21 0.37 
Difference  0.02 0.03 0.06 0.05 
p-value   0.66 0.47 0.53 0.56 
      
*  the cross-listing year    
See Appendix D for variable definitions.  Tests for differences in means are based on paired t-tests. Tests 
for differences in medians are based on Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. Bold numbers denote significance at 





TABLE 12: LOGIT REGRESSION WITH COUNTRY-FIXED EFFECT 
          
  H1  H2 
  Coefficient  Coefficient 
    (p-value)   (p-value) 
Intercept   -12.568***      -6.133*** 
                        (0.000)  (0.003) 
Reconcile    -1.582***  1.000 
                        (0.001)  (0.498) 
Disclosure    -2.102***    -4.506** 
                        (0.002)  (0.026) 
Size     1.879***       1.255*** 
                        (0.000)                        (0.000) 
Growth                         0.001                        -0.003 
                        (0.186)                        (0.445) 
Leverage                        -0.001***                        -0.000 
                        (0.005)                        (0.702) 
Industry                       Included  Included 
     
Country                       Included  Included 
     
  N = 6,618  N = 471 
Pseudo R2                          0.273   0.382 
 
See Appendix D for variable definitions.  The dependent variable under H1 is CL and the dependent 
variable under H2 is EX_CL. The models are estimated using the Logit regression. 




TABLE 13: LOGIT REGRESSION USING ALTERNATIVE VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
          
       H1  H2 
  Coefficient Coefficient 
          (p-value)  (p-value) 
Intercept     -6.86***      -16.307*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
L_Rec   0.213*  0.061 
  (0.077)  (0.834) 
H_Rec                        -0.020                       -0.506 
  (0.880)  (0.141) 
L_Dis        0.709***  0.296 
  (0.000)  (0.288) 
H_Dis       -0.570***  -0.550 
  (0.000)  (0.135) 
CIFAR       -0.064***        0.100*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Anti_D       0.214***  0.070 
  (0.000)  (0.589) 
F_Law       -0.477***        1.753*** 
  (0.009)  (0.000) 
G_Law       -1.275***  -1.139* 
  (0.000)  (0.064) 
S_Law                        -0.244                       -0.005 
  (0.368)  (0.993) 
EmergM        0.806***        1.301*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Liquidity                        -0.009  0.272 
  (0.897)  (0.229) 
LogGNP                        -0.024  0.120 
  (0.710)  (0.420) 
Size        1.420***        0.909*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Growth  0.001                       -0.002 
  (0.137)  (0.472) 
Leverage       -0.001***                       -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.660) 
     
  N = 6654  N = 533 
Pseudo R2   0.205  0.237 
 
See Appendix D for variable definitions.  The dependent variable under H1 is CL and the dependent 
variable under H2 is EX_CL. The models are estimated using the Logit regression. 
***, **, * indicate significance level, respectively, at 0.01, 005 and 0.1 level.  
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TABLE 14: VALUATION USING ALTERNATIVE VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
(N=6,654) 
  
Cross-listing  Exchange-listing 
 Model 1 Model 2   Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficient Coefficient   Coefficient Coefficient 
  (p-value) (p-value)     (p-value) (p-value) 
Intercept       1.256***       0.661***  Intercept    1.242***    0.697*** 
 (0.000) (0.001)      (0.000)   (0.000) 
CL 0.149 0.155  EX_CL    0.625***    0.615*** 
 (0.175) (0.155)      (0.001)   (0.001) 
L _Rec 0.057   0.078*  L _Rec     0.065* 0.085** 
 (0.159) (0.055)      (0.096)   (0.031) 
H _Rec  -0.066*       -0.063  H _Rec    -0.066*   -0.062 
 (0.095) (0.111)      (0.086)   (0.110) 
L_Dis 0.025 0.004  L_Dis     0.021    0.001 
 (0.548) (0.929)      (0.599)   (0.977) 
H_Dis -0.025      -0.021  H_Dis    -0.029   -0.025 
  (0.499)      (0.572)      (0.435)   (0.498) 
CL * L_Rec   0.247*   0.251*  EX_CL * L_Rec   0.656***    0.656*** 
 (0.061) (0.056)     (0.004)   (0.004) 
CL * H_Rec 0.024 0.059  EX_CL * H_Rec    0.455    0.477 
 (0.874) (0.697)     (0.146)   (0.128) 
CL *L_ Dis      -0.051      -0.062  EX_CL *L_ Dis   -0.161   -0.167 
      (0.700)      (0.639)     (0.472)   (0.456) 
CL *H_ Dis   -0.388**   -0.368**  EX_CL *H_ Dis -1.061***   -1.034*** 
 (0.012) (0.017)     (0.001)   (0.001) 
CIFAR        0.009***  CIFAR     0.008*** 
  (0.001)      (0.002) 
Anti_D -0.026*      -0.043***  Anti_D   -0.024*   -0.040*** 
      (0.051) (0.002)     (0.073)   (0.005) 
Liquidity       0.008       0.033***  Liquidity    0.011    0.034 
      (0.734) (0.002)     (0.637)   (0.152) 
Growth    0.001**   0.001*  Growth    0.001**    0.001* 
      (0.043) (0.061)     (0.044)   (0.060) 
ROA       0.053***       0.052***  ROA  0.052***    0.052*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000)   (0.000) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.130        0.134 0.135 
 
See Appendix D for variable definitions.  The dependent variable in the models is Tobin’s q. The models 
are estimated using the OLS regression. 
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